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The African continent possesses a wealth of natural mineral resources.  Arguments have 
been put forward that these natural mineral resources can be one of the potential solutions to 
unlocking the challenge of underdevelopment and pervasive poverty in many African 
countries. Understanding how African countries can gain greater benefit from these mineral 
resources was the emphasis of this dissertation. Focus was placed specifically on the 
Mozambique natural gas sector.  A case study methodology was employed with the purpose 
of determining whether Mozambique could gain greater participation in its natural gas value 
chain. Empirical and theoretical literature around mineral resources management including 
leading theories such as the resource curse were reviewed as key points of departure. A 
detailed analysis of historic natural gas projects executed in Mozambique, the legislative 
framework, contracts, and institutional and capacity demands then followed as a core part of 
the analysis. Finally, the study leaned on in-depth interviews with industry experts to 
understand the legal, policy, and technical barriers that could hinder Mozambique from 
gaining greater participation in the natural gas value chain. Key findings of the study pointed 
to the inadequacies of existing laws and contract provisions to deliver the vision of greater 
participation, barriers to entry such as high upfront capital requirements, and internal 
institutional and technical capacity gaps exemplified by the reliance on external technical 
assistance from partners such the World Bank. The study concluded that greater participation 
in the natural gas value chain could not be achieved through Mozambique legislating its way 
into upstream and midstream activities alone, rather, a progressive approach to gain greater 
participation was required, initially starting with increased participation in downstream 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether Mozambique can gain greater participation 
from its natural gas value chain.  
 
Natural mineral resources present a significant opportunity for countries across Africa to 
create a potential avenue out of poverty towards an improved standard of living for the 
majority. Natural gas, in particular, holds significant potential as a bridge energy source 
between coal and renewable energy. As of 2018, at a global level, Africa accounted for 7,3% 
of total proven gas reserves (British Petroleum [BP], 2019). These significant reserves across 
Africa are underscored by current producers such as Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Tanzania, 
Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique (Botes, Lane & Eginger, 2019). The case for what 
natural gas can do for the continent is indeed an exciting prospect. As an example, according 
to Smelcer (2019), the scale of power generation required to meet the African continents 
growing energy demands is well suited for gas-fired power as a bridge energy source which 
is cost-effective, relatively “green” and flexible. Countries such as Tanzania and 
Mozambique stand to benefit the most from potentially low-cost domestic gas which could 
potentially change the economic, industrial and social landscape of these countries. 
  
This study is thus within the context of countries such as Mozambique which are on the 
brink of significant potential growth, supported by mineral resources developments but still 
entrapped in high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Countries similar to 
Mozambique that discovered significant mineral resources wealth have the opportunity to 
change the narrative from an aid-dependent people to that of a people on the rise. It is for 
this purpose that this research has been conducted, to aid such countries in capitalising on 
the opportunity presented by vast natural gas discoveries. 
1.2 Background to the Study  
Mozambique is located on the east coast of the African continent bordering Tanzania, 
Malawi and South Africa. Covering a surface area of 786,000 square kilometres, the country 
hosts a population of 29.5 million people, has an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 




(World Bank, 2019). The Mozambican economy is structured around four key sectors: 
Agriculture, Industry, Manufacturing and Services, each consisting of 21%, 25%,11%, 
46,6% as a percentage of GDP respectively. The industry sector principally includes mining, 
construction, electricity, water, and natural gas [which is the focus of this study] (Source, 
World Bank, 2019).USD 14,46 Billion, GDP per capita (current) of USD 498.9 and a GDP 
Growth rate of 3,3% (World Bank, 2019). The Mozambican economy is structured around 
four key sectors: Agriculture, Industry, Manufacturing and Services, each consisting of 21%, 
25%,11%, 46,6% as a percentage of GDP respectively. The industry sector principally 
includes mining, construction, electricity, water, and natural gas [which is the focus of this 
study] (Source, World Bank, 2019). The natural gas sub-sector presents one of the most 
exciting opportunities for unparalleled growth in Mozambique. According to the 
International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2019), Mozambique could now possess what are argued 
to be potentially the third-largest natural gas finds in Africa after Nigeria and Algeria.  
 
Estimations are that between 100-200 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas have been 
discovered off the shore of Mozambique's Rovuma basin in the Northern Cabo Delgado 
province by Anadarko1 and ENI2 (Standard Bank, 2019b). This is in addition to and in stark 
contrast to the mere 2-3 TCF of natural gas (proven) discovered in the Pande-Temane region 
of Mozambique which until recently was the only source of commercial production for 
natural gas in Mozambique (World Bank, 2003). The natural gas currently produced 
commercially from the Pande-Temane region is exported to South Africa while the recent 
discoveries of natural gas and the associated future commercial production have been 
contracted for export mostly to Asia when the first gas starts to flow post-2023. To put the 
scale of these discoveries into context, one need only consider that the 2-3 TCF of Pande-
Temane natural gas, which currently exports an estimated 167 million gigajoules per annum 
(mGJ/a), has successfully supported a significant proportion of gas demand for large 
industrial and manufacturing businesses in South Africa, and is expected to continue up until 
2023 (Human, 2019).  
 
1 All of Anadarko’s Africa oil and gas assets were subsequently sold to Total in September 2019 (including the 
Area 1 Interest) 
22 Part of the ENI Stake (35,7%) was sold to Exxon Mobile in 2019. ENI and Exxon subsequently took up a 




With the new findings of between 100-200 TCF in the Rovuma basin of Mozambique, 
between five to ten times the current amount of commercial gas will be produced for export 
to predominately Asian markets as Liquid Natural Gas (LNG).  
 
To further illustrate the scale of the potential, Standard Bank (2019) estimates that some of 
the largest projects in the world will be developed in Mozambique due to the significant 
natural gas finds. As an example, Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) estimated at USD 55 billion 
at the Afungi site in northern Mozambique for gas-related projects will potentially be the 
world's largest construction site after the Gorgon LNG project in Australia which had a total 
CAPEX value of USD54 billion. Furthermore, according to Smelcer (2019), Mozambique 
is well-positioned with recent discoveries to become the third-largest exporter of LNG 
behind Qatar and Australia. With the significant potential that exists to leverage the natural 
gas resource, this then begs the question, what benefit will Mozambique retain from its 
natural gas?  
 
The purpose of this study is thus to explore whether Mozambique could gain greater 
participation from its natural gas value chain that consists of upstream, midstream and 
downstream activities. Also, greater participation of the host country encompassing the 
State, local private sector and local communities. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Natural mineral resources have been extracted commercially on a large scale from the 
African continent for decades (Kabemba, 2017; Tunde-Oni, 2016; Shell, 2013). Since the 
first oil and gas resources were extracted for commercial gain in the early 1900s in Nigeria, 
Algeria and Libya, there is little progress in the development of concrete, sustainable and 
impactful solutions to how African countries can gain greater benefit from these mineral 
resources. There is an apparent perpetual dependency on development aid, donor funding 
and handouts even in mineral-rich nations. Countries continue to register mediocre 
development outcomes and, in some cases, regressive development outcomes 
notwithstanding the vast mineral resource wealth that some African nations possess (Billion, 
2016). Countries such as Algeria, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are 





Countries across the continent have seemingly bought into the narrative that receipt of 
revenues from royalties and other mineral taxes from resource extraction is sufficient in 
exchange for allowing large multinational corporations to extract mineral resources from the 
African continent. The argument put forward by Massol and Estañol (2014) is that any 
government planner’s portfolio that focuses only on mineral resources export revenue, taxes 
and royalties would be sub-optimal if the planner considered the variability and potential 
volatility of mineral resource export earnings to underpin the fiscus.  
 
Countries across the continent seemingly continue to fight over what is effectively a smaller 
piece of the pie, relying on royalties and the little taxes afforded to them in exchange for 
mineral resources extraction rights by large multinational corporations. Panford (2017) 
argues that some African countries are embarking on what appears to be a competition, 
outbidding each other to offer multinationals concession contracts on extremely generous 
terms which do not deliver the greatest benefit for the majority of the population. Panford 
(2017) further argues that some analysts are erroneous in their assumptions that (in the case 
of his research) Ghana and indeed other mineral-rich African countries are impoverished and 
poor due to wastage and pilferage of large amounts of revenues. The argument Panford 
(2017) points to is that the size of the pie received is indeed smaller than most protagonists 
portray or imagine.  
 
According to Beegle et al. (2016), more than ten of the most imbalanced countries in the 
world are found in Africa while citizens in resource-rich countries have worse outcomes in 
terms of human welfare indexes. Pashkov and Zumkeller (1996:4) further point out that ‘no 
other region in the world makes so little use of its natural mineral wealth for the benefit of 
its peoples as Africa’. Botes, Lane and Eginger (2019: 2) also observe that oil and gas exports 
are the primary driver for economic growth in energy-exporting countries. However, oil can 
account for more than 90% of the revenue and the bulk of fiscal revenues, however, African 
energy exporters are struggling to fully harness this potential for sustainable economic 







It can thus be argued that simply possessing a wealth of mineral resources is not enough to 
deliver a country from poverty and transition it to higher standards of living for all. The mere 
existent of this mineral resource wealth in the absence of clear frameworks and strategies to 
harness this potential is documented over the decades to, in fact, have a negative impact 
culminating in some cases into armed conflict in countries such as Nigeria (Udosen, 2009). 
 
Indeed, a counter argument can be made that some African countries have received some 
notable developmental benefits from their mineral resources. A prime example being 
Botswana which has managed to establish a sovereign wealth fund titled the pula fund which 
has in previous times been utilised for developmental objectives such as providing universal 
primary education as well as at least three years universal secondary education among other 
developmental gains (ANRC, 2016). Notwithstanding positive stories from such as these, 
most other African countries’ remain at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to adequately 
utilise their natural mineral resources for better development outcomes. With this in mind, 
the perplexing question then becomes why? Why is the African continent at a disadvantage 
when it comes to leveraging mineral resources for better development outcomes and local 
benefit, notwithstanding the plethora of mineral resources projects executed across the 
continent over the decades? Perhaps the answer may lie in a better understanding of mineral 
resources value chains. The broader central question then becomes, can Mozambique gain 
greater participation from its natural gas value chain? 
1.4 Primary Research Objective 
The primary objective of the study is to determine whether Mozambique can gain greater 
participation from its natural gas value chain.  
 
Secondary research objectives included the following: 
• To understand the history of Mozambique’s participation in its natural gas value 
chain.  
• To determine the legislative frameworks that are in place to help Mozambique 
achieve greater participation from its natural gas value chain. 
• To determine concession contract provisions relevant to participation in the value 
chain. 
• To determine barriers that hinder achievement of greater participation in the natural 




1.5 Research Questions 
 
• Which natural gas projects have been executed in Mozambique? 
• What legislative frameworks are in place to underpin how Mozambique can achieve 
greater participation from the natural gas value chain?  
• Which provisions have been used in the concession contracts to achieve greater 
participation in the natural value chain? 
• What are the barriers that could hinder Mozambique from gaining greater benefit 
from its natural gas value chain? 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
A significant body of research exists detailing phenomena such as the resource curse and the 
Dutch disease concerning the paradox of high natural mineral resource wealth and utter 
abject poverty within communities where these resources are found (Priya, 2011; Billon, 
2006; Auty 1995; Udosen, Etok & George, 2009). Most authors have pointed to matters of 
governance, political interference, strengthening fiscal regimes, the strength of State 
institutions, and over-dependence for income on a single mineral resource as some core 
explanations for this phenomenon.  
 
Many authors have written extensively about mineral resources management, government, 
and development from the perspective of profitability, technological advancement to 
improve commercial viability, administration of public funds and corruption. Some 
arguments are encapsulated in research that sought to explain, challenge or complement 
resource curse narratives. There appears, however, to be limited literature regarding the 
narrative that explores greater participation of the host country in its mineral resources value 
chain. Specifically, the literature that adequately explores whether there is an argument that 
greater participation in the mineral resources value chain by a mineral-rich but economically 
poor country would yield greater benefit (country is defined not only as a government but 
broadly including other local private companies, local citizens and local development 
organisations, among others). Literature around resource-based industrialisation (Massol & 
Estañol (2014); Pashkov & Zumkeller (1996); Roemer 1976) attempts to cover elements of 






The massive gas discoveries in Mozambique are also recent, as such limited research exists 
for the specific circumstances and conditions of Mozambique. To illustrate this example, not 
until before the concession contracts were signed in 2006 for the Rovuma Area 1 and Area 
4 gas blocks in northern Mozambique was there any anticipation that Mozambique could 
potentially become a formidable global supplier of Liquified Natural Gas - potentially the 
third-largest supplier in the world after Australia and Qatar (IMF, 2019). This research thus 
differs from other studies conducted in the area of mineral resources management and 
governance in terms of context and scale of resources found in Mozambique.  
 
This study is also significant, particularly the selection of Mozambique as the case study in 
that it aims to complement existing knowledge that can empower Mozambique to avoid the 
pitfalls of under/mis-utilisation, or the “cheap give away” narrative of mineral resources that 
have befallen Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo as 
articulated by Panford (2017), Billion (2016) and Massol and Estañol (2014). 
 
This study is also significant given for most African countries, and in this case, Mozambique, 
natural mineral resources are potentially the only significant avenue available to dig 
themselves out of underdevelopment, poverty and inequality. Priya (2011) concurs with this 
view articulating the need to better explain and understand how greater value can be 
extracted from mineral resources to aid mineral-rich but economically poor countries in 
Africa through her research on the Chad oil pipeline. 
 
Finally, this study is significant as the intention is also to create a roadmap or blueprint that 
can potentially be transposed to other African countries that have recently discovered more 
oil and gas resources in Africa such as South Africa. It is evident that the forebearers in the 
oil and gas arena, which include Nigeria and Angola, have not adequately created a blueprint 
for how to gain greater benefit for the good of the majority. This study presents the 








1.7 Outline of the Study 
The remainder of the dissertation is set out as follows: 
 
Chapter Two consists of the literature review and forms the basis of the analytical framework 
for the study. Chapter Three provides an analysis of historic Mozambique gas projects. 
Chapter Four presents the methodology. Chapter Five outlines the analysis and findings of 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The following section provides a literature review of some of the key arguments and debates 
creating an analytical framework for this dissertation. The approach taken to conduct the 
literature review was to identify the literature that expounds upon the dynamics of gaining 
greater participation in the natural gas value chain as well as theories and arguments 
explaining why some mineral-rich countries fail to achieve more significant benefit from 
their mineral resources. Theoretical and empirical literature reviews were conducted. The 
theoretical literature examines the body of theory that exists in relation to a particular 
phenomenon, theories, concepts or issues (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2016). The 
empirical literature relates to the body of studies based on observations and events that have 
been experienced and can be studied or measured (ibid). 
 
Within the scope of theoretical literature, core theories identified include the resource curse, 
Statist and societal theories. This literature was deemed significant in that it provided some 
insights as to why mineral-rich countries fail to attain greater benefit from their mineral 
resources as well as providing some insight into the proposals other authors have put forward 
to curb these challenges. 
 
Following the theoretical literature review, an empirical literature review was conducted.  In 
identifying potential focus areas for the empirical literature review, some guidance was 
sought from perspectives provided by other authors. Ronke (2014) as an example articulates 
that critical challenges impacting the participation of independent indigenous oil companies 
in countries such Nigeria across the value chain are an inadequate legislative framework to 
govern local content and local participation. Ronke (2014) also points out other material 
impediments to local players participating in the oil industry including limited local liquidity 
to finance long-term, large-scale exploration and development projects, limited 
technological capability and low/no credit ratings of local players. The empirical literature 
thus assessed key topics which cover legislation, financing, technology and participation. 
These themes were relevant to this study, given they provided some of the core 
underpinnings of how a State could potentially gain greater participation in the mineral 






Finally, some literature was also reviewed concerning good practice considering how other 
States have managed to gain greater participation as well as the general legislative good 
practice at a global level.  
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
 
Economic Development 
The concept of gaining greater value from the mineral resources value chain is centred 
(among other principles) around leveraging the mineral resources for greater economic 
development. The principle of economic development can be defined as being the 
consequence of long-term investments in the generation of infrastructure, new ideas, and 
knowledge transfer, which rely on functioning economic and social institutions and on 
cooperation between civil society, public and private sector (Feldman, Hadjimichael, 
Kemeny, Lanahan, 2014). Economic development involves the interaction between 
individuals, firms, organisations and nations based on their skills and resources to create 
value which is ultimately distributed across the population utilising certain criteria 
(Fagerberg and Srholec, 2017). Within this context of economic development, various ideas 
have attempted to explain why States fail or struggle to gain greater value from their mineral 
resources. These theories are utilised as a basis to explore the available literature to 
determine core themes later applied as the analytical framework for the dissertation.  
 
Resource Curse Theory 
The leading theory in the area of mineral resources management is the resource curse. The 
argument is that there is a negative relationship between increased economic development 
and high mineral resources wealth (Auty, 1993; Auty, 1995; Billon, 2006; Udosen, Etok & 
George, 2009; Priya, 2011). The theory articulates that the greater the mineral resource 
wealth possessed by a country, the lower the level of economic development experienced by 
that country. Ross (2015) provides some insights into how this mechanism may unfold. In 
the case of petroleum wealth, the significantly high amount of wealth may lead to effects 
such as elevated levels of corruption as many actors seek to benefit from the vast wealth.  
This, in some cases, results in inefficiency of resource allocation as policy decisions, contract 




Secondly, countries with high mineral resource wealth tend to be plagued by war, in most 
cases, a civil war with the devastating effect of halting economic activity in war-torn areas 
and extensive social and economic costs to sustain the wars as well as to heal the wounds 
left in their path (Ross, 2015). Finally, at the heart of the resource curse theory are the 
negative effects of a stronger currency. In the first instance, the resource boom may result in 
an appreciation of the exchange rate which could negatively impact the competitiveness of 
other sectors internationally (Priya, 2011). Secondly, the resource boom can lead to domestic 
price inflation, increased imports, and a negative impact on demand in domestic sectors 
(Dobbs, R., Oppenheim, J., Kendall, A., Thompson, F., Bratt, M., and van der Marel, F, 
2013). In this regard, one of the sectors typically affected in Africa is the agriculture sector 
while in the case of the natural gas boom in the Netherlands which gave way to the term 
“Dutch disease”, the sector which suffered the most was manufacturing (Priya, 2011).  All 
these elements are examples of how fertile grounds for dampened and, in some cases, 
regressive economic growth may be created. 
 
Statist Theory 
A second common narrative is what Ross (1999) classifies as Statist theory. This theory 
relates to concepts of poor State capability and its resultant negative impact on positive 
development outcomes. The argument put forward is that States that have inadequate 
institutional capacity and experience fail to maximise the benefit from their resources 
(agricultural, mineral or other capital resources), regardless of whether they have good well-
articulated policies or not (Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock, 2017; Balian & Shorjian, 2018).  
 
Societal Theory 
A third frequent narrative centres on societal theories as classified by Ross (1999). These 
include the influence of the privileged elite, interest groups, sectors and well-connected 
actors. These theories propose that a collection of a few elites that have access to, and control 
of resources, utilise them to distribute rents which allow them to maintain their power and 
influence at the expense of broader generation and sharing of economic wealth for the masses 






The theories mentioned above provide a general overview of existing ideas that attempt to 
explain why mineral-rich countries have been failing to gain greater benefit from their 
mineral resources. Their relevance is that they provide some perspective into what other 
authors have surmised when it comes to how mineral-rich countries can better manage 
mineral resources. In order to complement and add to these theories, this dissertation seeks 
to explore the concept of participation in the value chain as a potential entry point to gaining 
greater value from mineral resources wealth. 
2.3 Empirical Literature Review 
The following outlines the empirical literature review which principally covers resource 
curse narratives, participation in the value chain (structural and equity), ownership and 
legislative dynamics and financing dynamics.  
 
Resource Curse Narratives 
An extensive amount of literature exists on the phenomena commonly referred to as the 
resource curse. Billion (2006) conducted an extensive analysis of the resource curse 
characteristics, its effects, as well as identifying potential solutions to the scourge. The 
research revealed that on average, resource-rich nations had experienced lower economic 
growth over 30 years when compared to non-resource-rich nations.  
One of the notable findings of the research was that bureaucrats controlling resource rents 
in resource-rich nations affected by the resource curse often exhibited high institutional 
inertia and conservatism, fighting to maintain the status quo. The study concluded that strong 
institutions and diversified economies in resource-rich nations prone to the resource curse 
were vital to avoid poor economic performance and governance failures which contrasted 
against the expectation of greater benefit from the mineral resources – what Billion 
(2006:27) termed a “resource bonanza”.  
 
Auty (2006) supported Billion’s (2006) assertions about the negative impact of high rent-
seeking behaviour on the ability of a State to gain greater value from its mineral resources. 
Research by Auty (2006) on mineral resource management aimed to provide an economic 
perspective to explain the peculiarities of how mineral rents are managed, in some cases 
resulting in different development outcomes. Auty (2006) argued that there are two key 
models of resource-driven development – a “low rent industrialisation driven model” and a 




Auty (2006: 629) stipulates that the low rent model encourages countries to promote wealth 
creation and encourage early competitive industrialisation while countries caught in the high 
rent staple trap model were prone to deflecting incentives for wealth creation and 
industrialisation replacing these with rent redistribution providing higher and more 
immediate rewards on the political front. Findings from the study pointed to three distinct 
characteristics exhibited by Indonesia and Malaysia which aided them in avoiding severe 
impacts of the resource curse. These were sound macroeconomic management, control of 
rent-seeking behaviour and notable efforts to raise the standard of living of the rural poor 
through infrastructure and agricultural mechanisation. The study concluded by highlighting 
that alignment with initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) could also play a crucial role in reducing negative mineral resource rent-seeking 
behaviour.  
 
Another important narrative put forward by authors as having a significant impact on a 
country’s ability to gain higher value from its mineral resources is the concept of State 
capability and capacity. Priya (2011) conducted research that shed some light on this 
phenomenon based on a qualitative case study of the Chad-Cameroon oil and gas pipeline. 
The study assessed the inverse relationship between the extensive dependence on mineral 
resources and poor economic development. It concluded that the main approaches to the 
mitigating effects of the resource curse should include consideration of the political situation 
in the host country prior to embarking on an oil and gas project to lessen political risk, as 
well as ensure a certain level of host country institutional capacity as a prerequisite for 
maximum benefit from the project.  
 
The arguments posed by Priya (2011) relating to State capability and institutional capacity 
are also supported by Ross (2018) who stipulated that a consensus was emerging regarding 
the mediating effect of institutional quality in moulding the relationship between mineral-
rich nations and their associated development outcomes. The study conducted by Ross 
(2018) utilised the analytic narrative approach to explain the variance in outcomes between 
two oil- and gas-rich nations (Angola and Nigeria) in terms of projects executed – Nigeria 





Results from the study revealed that variance in State institutional quality and effects of an 
authoritarian regime partially contributed to the different commitment and credibility 
positions between Angola and Nigeria for the successful implementation of oil and gas 
projects. The study concluded that the different political settlements and political economy 
trajectories helped explain the differing outcomes between Nigeria and Angola.  
 
Linked to the theme of State capability is the narrative of mineral resource mismanagement. 
Research conducted by Udosen, Etok and George (2009) investigated the “paradox of 
plenty” in the oil and gas sector, using Nigeria as a case study. Udosen et al. (2009) argued 
that nations with significant mineral resources reserves should be at the forefront of 
prosperity, but they found themselves significantly disadvantaged in their drive for economic 
development, notwithstanding the resource wealth they possessed. Results from their 
research showed that although oil wealth in Nigeria was initially channelled to the 
development of the country, successive mismanagement by the government led to political 
instability, rampant corruption, and militancy in the Niger delta.  
 
In contrast to the views which support the resource curse narrative and its various 
mechanisms of manifestation, an alternative analysis is provided by Panford (2017) that 
investigated whether phenomena such as the resource curse could explain the outcomes of 
the oil and gas developments in Ghana. The research investigated various arguments by other 
authors for and against the resource curse. It drew parallels to other major events and theories 
such as the cold war, neo-colonialism and neoliberal economics to help provide an 
alternative explanation to the resource curse for Ghana’s experience with oil and gas. The 
findings of the research pointed to the need for a more contextual proposition of arguments 
to explain the paradox of plenty, indicating inadequately framed use of common narratives 
such as corruption and squandering of revenues. The study concluded that there was a need 
for some areas and activities to be prioritised to better prepare for, and speed up socio-
economic development, leveraging oil and gas. Key areas cited included deal negotiations, 
education, skills development, value addition through industrialisation, local content, 






Similar to the contrasting views of Panford (2017), Boschini, Pettersson & Roine (2012) also 
challenge the resource curse narrative, arguing that notwithstanding the empirical evidence 
that shows a negative relationship between resource-rich countries and the corresponding 
GDP growth, there are also notable exceptions where resource-rich countries have seen 
positive growth. In particular, countries such as Botswana, Australia and Norway (Boschini, 
Pettersson & Roine, 2012).  
 
The above literature clearly outlines some of the mainstream theories regarding why 
countries fail to gain greater benefit from their mineral resources, and potential solutions to 
increase this benefit by way of mitigating effects of the resource curse. Some of the key 
learnings from these theories are around the mechanisms through which the resource curse 
phenomenon propagates, such as high rent-seeking behaviour and deflecting incentives for 
wealth creation in favour of immediate political gains. The success stories are also evident 
from the literature, suggesting that leadership regimes with characteristics that are non-
authoritarian possessing institutional quality, good governance, and capacity present a case 
for potentially better outcomes in terms of gaining greater value from mineral resources 
wealth. This dissertation thus seeks to add to these theories, by investigating the role that the 
greater participation of Mozambique in the value chain could play in potentially mitigating 
effects of the resource curse and increasing the benefit of Mozambique from its mineral 
resources.  
 
Participation in the Value Chain  
There is no universal definition of what constitutes participation in the mineral resources 
value chain. From a technical perspective, the first level of participation is the equity stake 
(participatory interest) a country can have in a natural gas concession which accordingly 
may provide it with access to upstream, midstream and downstream rights and obligations. 
The second level of participation can be from a structural perspective that falls outside of the 
concession agreements. This structural element may speak to the level of involvement of the 
government in utilising and integrating the natural gas resource into the industrial activity 







Figure 2.1: Natural gas value chain 
 
 
Source: Saoga, 2019. 
 
Structural Participation through Industrialisation 
In relation to gaining greater value from mineral resources from a structural value chain 
perspective, Roemer (1976) conducted quantitative research aimed at demonstrating the 
potential contribution of resource-based industrialisation to efficient growth, employment, 
equality and economic independence in resource-rich developing countries. Key findings 
from the study revealed that host countries enjoyed comparative advantage for export of 
industrial processed goods for resources such as copper, bauxite, aluminium and timber due 
to factors such as reduced weight and transport costs and value addition. Cheap natural gas 
was, in particular, noted as a crucial contributor to making the export of refined iron ore and 
steel competitive on a global scale. The research found that contributions from resource-
based industries to employment and correspondingly equality were minimal due to the 
capital-intensive nature of resource industries and high barriers to entry from multinationals. 
Roemer (1976) concluded that further research is essential given the limited information 
available on strategies for resource-based industrialisation. 
 
In contrast to Roemer (1976), a study by Pashkov and Zumkeller (1996) observed some 
benefits from resource-based industries seeking to gain greater value from the mineral 
resources. Pashkov and Zumkeller (1996) conducted a quantitative analysis of the gap 
between the production and utilisation of mineral resources and energy in Africa. The 
objective was to develop policy scenarios for how Africa could better utilise its resources at 
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Findings from the analysis indicated vast underconsumption of raw mineral resources on a 
domestic level on the African continent compared to production. The research also revealed 
that Africa failed to value its resources adequately and, in a sense, gave them away too 
cheaply in raw form. This observation, when combined with low levels of productive assets 
acquisition, was noted to have led to the underutilised human capital, pervasive poverty and 
degradation of political and social structures. The study concluded that there was a need to 
expand the actors involved in mineral resources value chains to include local communities 
and local private companies which could deliver a multiplier effect on industrial 
development.  
 
Massol and Estañol (2014) concurred however with the analysis conducted by Roemer 
(1976) to some extent. Their quantitative empirical research aimed to develop a methodology 
to assess the performance of resource-based export diversification strategies using the Mean-
Variance Portfolio (MVP) approach. The key natural gas resource-based industries assessed 
included LNG export, metal processing industries such as aluminium smelting, steel and 
iron production, gas to liquids (GTL) industries producing fuels such as diesel or methanol 
and fertilizer industries producing urea. Findings indicated that diversification away from 
the export of raw resources to export based on resource processing industries was not 
necessarily a solution. The study also found that some countries would benefit by modifying 
their resource monetisation strategies. Finally, the study found that the relevance of some 
gas-based industries is questionable, in that they provided a lower benefit compared to that 
from raw export of natural gas as LNG as an example.  
 
Equity Participation  
Ellis (2015) conducted some research into the level of participation of the South African 
State in the oil and gas sector. The analysis conducted by Ellis aimed to understand the 
potential impact of proposals to increase State participation on critical matters such as 
investment in the upstream oil and gas sector which focuses on exploration activities. One 
of the main components of the proposal was an increase in the free carry participation 







Box 1: Free Carry Participating Interest 
A key concept that requires some broader elaboration regarding participation is the free carry interest concept. 
Breeding (1963) explains that the co-owner of a development that agrees to carry the interest is the carrier, or 
the carrying party and the co-owner for whom costs are advanced is the carried party. Villarreal (2013:1) 
elaborates that this means the other parties would effectively “carry” the costs of the carried party “paying all 
or part of his or her share of the costs involved in the development prospect”. Ellis (2015) further confirms that 
a free carry can range from costs carried for the natural gas exploration phase (exploration carry) to costs 
carried for all exploration and production expenditure (complete carry). Due to the significant cost of acquiring 
working interest in the resources developments some countries typically negotiate a free carry interest, this 
means that their share of costs associated with the development of the natural gas resource is paid for by the 
other parties to the development (typically international developers). The implication of holding a free carry 
interest in relation to adequate participation is a key theme this dissertation analyses in later chapters as 
arguments will be made about the ability of stakeholders with a controlling stake to gain greater benefit.  
 
Findings from the study partially provided some perspectives on the landscape of 
participation from the viewpoint of equity in concessions (participatory interest).  
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, across Africa, most countries have participatory interests in 
concession contracts of up to 10% or less on average, while there are a few cases such as 
Algeria where the participatory interest is as high as 40%. The study noted, however, that 
the countries with high participatory interests had well-established oil and gas sectors which 
reflected the level of negotiating power of the State in obtaining such a high stake.  
 
Figure 2.2: Levels of grouped State participation in concession contracts in Africa 
 





Research by Ellis (2015) also revealed that the proposals by South Africa to exercise greater 
participation in its natural gas value chain seemed to create uncertainty with investors, 
resulting in them reconsidering their capital plans pending further clarification of the 
legislation. Ellis (2015) concluded that the proposed high increases in State participation 
through amendments to the legislation would likely cause a decline in investment within the 
upstream oil and gas sector in South Africa. In alignment with the views by Ellis (2015), 
Bowmans (2013) asserted that the potential shareholding in gas projects proposed by South 
Africa was so high as to create a disincentive for international oil companies to invest. 
Kabemba (2017:3) classifies this phenomenon of concerns regarding local players having 
too large an equity stake as “over incentivisation to attract foreign direct investment”. He 
argues that in some cases, the exemptions and relaxed regulations lead to deteriorating 
profits and arguably lower participation for host African governments in the value chain. 
 
Ownership and Legislative Dynamics 
The concept of mineral resource ownership and associated legislation is relevant to this 
dissertation in that it provides some insights into key elements of control, distribution of 
rents and ultimately the level of benefit that can be garnered by the de facto “owner”. 
Furthermore, the level of participation in the natural gas value chain (which this dissertation 
expounds upon in later chapters) itself is embedded, and to an extent, aligned with the 
ownership dynamics. The definition itself of what constitutes ownership is variable. 
However, the following literature provides some insights into how ownership is defined 
across various countries in the oil and gas sectors.  
 
According to one of the concession contracts for natural gas projects executed in 
Mozambique, up until the resource has been extracted from the ground and reaches the 
“wellhead3” where the resource emerges from the ground – it remains the sole property of 
the State, but it effectively has no commercial value. Once the resource exits the ground, 
sole ownership transfers from the State to the Concessionaire (which in the case of 
Mozambique includes the State). Clause 20 of the Anadarko Area 1 Contract, (2006:70) 
stipulates the following: 
 
3 "Wellhead" means the inlet flange of the first valve after the wellhead production manifold. Source: Anadarko 





Title to the Concessionaire's entitlement of Petroleum Produced under this 
Exploration & Production Contract (EPC) shall pass to the Concessionaire at 
the Wellhead. Thereafter the Government and the Concessionaire shall own the 
Petroleum jointly, and in undivided shares, until each takes individual title to 
and delivery of its entitlement of Petroleum at the Delivery Point4. 
 
Standard Bank has conducted extensive research into the natural gas developments in 
Mozambique focusing on providing an independent macroeconomic assessment of the 
impact that the natural gas discoveries in northern Mozambique could potentially have on 
the Mozambican economy.  
One of the notable assertions made by Standard Bank (2019b:26) is where it points out that 
“The government of Mozambique does not own the gas”. Standard Bank (2019b:26) goes 
on to explain that “the gas is owned by the concession for the EPC term”. The inference 
from Standard Bank (2019b) here refers to the level of control and decision making with 
which the “real owner” retains either in terms of whom to sell the gas to, or how much gas 
can be retained/utilised in the domestic economy of Mozambique. Both are elements over 
which Mozambique notably had little control, and thus speaks to the question of the necessity 
for greater access and participation on the part of Mozambique.  
 
In the case of Libya, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1986) holds the view 
that the Libyan government was heavily dependent on foreign oil companies for operating 
and maintaining its oil industry. In subsequent periods, however, the oil major Shell (2013) 
points out that in 1970, the Libyan government decided to take control of the oil and gas 
resource which had for a period been operated and exploited by foreign companies. Key 
elements of the reforms included nationalisation of distribution activities and 
implementation of rule 66, which limited foreign company shareholding in production to 




4 "Delivery Point" means in the case of Natural Gas the inlet flange of the transmission pipeline. Source: 




Finally, developments in Nigeria also provide some relevant context to ownership and 
legislation in the sector. According to Onuegbu (2016), it was only in 1956 that Shell-BP 
found oil in Oliobiri, Nigeria. Due to the colonial influence, legislation to start improved 
taxation of the oil and gas industry only occurred between 1961-1990, when the government 
of Nigeria introduced its first regulations in which profits would be shared equally between 
the government of Nigeria and international oil companies. Onuegbu (2016) suggests that it 
was also in the post-1960 period that the level of participation of the Nigerian government 
in the industry started to shift from merely being a regulator and collector of royalties and 
taxes to the owner. The history of developments in Nigeria points to a noteworthy evolution 
of dynamics regarding ownership and control of the natural oil and gas resources. The 
observation made by Onuegbu (2016) regarding a transition from being a mere royalty 
collector to becoming an “owner” is particularly striking.  
 
Kabemba (2017) also provides views aligning with the trajectory taken by Nigeria arguing 
that while the renegotiation of mineral resources contracts for more significant benefit is 
appropriate as a corrective measure, laws must be changed on moral and rights-based 
grounds to improve the benefits to the host African country. Kabemba (2017) further 
articulates that African countries need to increase their ownership of assets producing 
mineral resources stating that whoever controls the resource has substantial power to control 
revenue sharing and benefits. Pashkov and Zumkeller (1996) concur, stipulating that “It is a 
core right of citizens to control their country's national natural resources”. 
 
In alignment with the views put forward by Kabemba (2017), Pashkov and Zumkeller 
(1996), a study was conducted by Ronke (2014) that examined the levels of participation of 
indigenous oil companies in Nigeria. The study sought to determine the challenges faced by 
these indigenous companies for the execution of oil and gas projects. One of the key 
challenges impacting their participation in Nigeria across the value chain were inadequate 
legislative frameworks to govern local content and local participation. Findings by Ronke 
(2014) indicated that until the 1970s, the international companies controlled the oil and gas 
resources by way of concessions with the obligation to only pay some sums of money as 





Ronke (2014) continues, however, that after the 1970s, Nigeria’s participatory approach to 
the oil and gas industry altered to start including participation in joint venture and production 
sharing agreements which meant greater involvement of the host country in other parts of 
the value chain. Ronke (2014:8) concluded that one of the solutions to the lack of adequate 
participation was the licensing of marginal fields to local players and enactment of new 
legislation – “the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act of 2010”.  
 
In contrast to Ronke (2015), a study by Oluwasanmi (2018) contends that progress is slow 
in creating the appropriate legislative frameworks to address issues such as technology 
transfer. Research by Oluwasanmi (2018) assessed participation in the oil and gas value 
chain through the lens of technology. It analysed issues of technology transfer in relation to 
entrepreneurial development. The study found that that countries such as Nigeria had indeed 
made some efforts to increase indigenous participation through various local content, 
indigenous participation and marginal field development policies. The study noted, however, 
that despite these efforts, the oil and gas value chain remained predominantly controlled by 
multinationals in Nigeria. One of the key factors cited was the advanced technological 
capability of multinationals and the lack thereof on the part of Nigerian companies.  
The study concluded that the investigation of technology transfer mechanisms was an 
essential starting point to improve access and participation of local players in the oil and gas 
industry.  
 
Financing Dynamics  
The final theme noted in the literature review is the financing of oil and gas projects in 
Africa. The importance is underscored by assertions made by Ronke (2014) articulating that 
material impediments to local players in Africa participating in the oil industry include 
limited local liquidity to finance long-term, large-scale exploration and development 
projects and low/no credit ratings of local players. 
 
In addition to the impediments noted by Ronke (2014), Simelane and Mohamed (2012) 
suggest that governments in Africa have traditionally financed infrastructure projects with 





Temitope (2013) argues for an alternative approach, specifying that taking infrastructure 
finance off the government balance sheet through structures such as Build Operate Transfer 
concessions creates a mutually beneficial scenario for both government and private 
investors. However, notwithstanding the notion put forward regarding off-balance-sheet 
financing, Simelane and Mohamed (2012) contend that those African countries are plagued 
with limited access to domestic and international capital markets and low credit ratings 
leading to dependency on international investors (Simelane and Mohamed, 2012). The 
assertions made by Simelane and Mohamed (2012) contrast with the Korean model as an 
example, where investment in the development of the LNG industry was government-led, 
given Korea’s ability to access international capital markets to borrow (ANRC, 2017).  
 
Simelane and Mohamed (2012) elaborate on some options for avenues to improve liquidity 
for infrastructure investment including “cost-reducing technology, using syndicated loans, 
expanding pension funds and project bonds, increasing partial risk guarantees, using 
indexing for foreign currency risk and the project finance approach”, among others.  
Expanding on the project finance method presented by Simelane and Mohamed (2012), 
research by Ronke (2014) identified project finance as a key approach used for large-scale 
oil and gas projects. Ronke (2014) states that over the years, the concept of project finance 
emerged as one of the core mechanisms for financing projects in Africa. Ronke (2014) 
asserts that project finance developed over the years as a vehicle to pool funds from a range 
of investors typically consisting of debt, equity, credit enhancers and political risk cover to 
provide finance for projects typically with a high cost of capital, long tenure and a high-risk 
profile.  
 
Dornel (2014: 4) supports Ronke (2014) defining project finance as “structured long-term 
financing of infrastructure, industrial, and public services projects with limited recourse to 
the sponsors, where project debt is repaid from future cash flow generated by the project 
once operational”. Some key features of project finance transactions relevant to natural gas 
projects include the high cost of capital, high leverage, non-recourse or limited recourse 
financing, long tenure and high risk (Dornel, 2014). Further to the picture painted by Dornel 
(2014), Hoffman (1998) provides some historical context stating that project financing as 
observed today started as early as the 1970s due to the increasing inability of governments 




and tenure. The characteristics described by Hoffman, aptly explain the financial scale and 
complexity of large-scale oil and gas projects on the African continent today.  
 
Finally, an alternative approach to financing oil and gas projects (and indeed other projects) 
in Africa has been the resource-backed financing approach. Resource-backed financing 
refers to what is commonly described as low interest or “free” loans, but in reality, they are 
typically inflated transactions that amount to infrastructure investments in exchange for 
mineral resources Deloitte (2019). The material attraction to Chinese loans is significantly 
low-interest rates and long tenures often spanning over 15 years (ibid). 
 
Ross (2018) articulates that some of the first large “oil-for-infrastructure” deals on the 
continent took place in Angola with the Chinese for oil and gas. Vines (2010) supports the 
assertions made by Ross articulating that by 2009, China had facilitated infrastructure loans 
of up to USD 13,4 billion and in exchange, they received oil equity in key oil and gas 
exploration deep-water blocks.  
The Deloitte (2019) analysis makes the point, however, that the Chinese resource-backed 
funding model has come under some scrutiny because it reinforces the resource curse. 
 
Conclusion 
The central observations from the theoretical and empirical literature point to a history of 
African governments relying on foreign companies to conduct exploration and development 
activities, mostly due to the significant amount of capital and technological advancement 
required to develop commercially viable projects. These themes are central issues in the 
narrative of participatory dynamics in the mineral resources value chains. The African 
Natural Resources Centre (ANRC, 2017), argues that few African governments are in a 
position to borrow and finance the scale of natural gas projects in the manner done by 
countries such as Korea. As a result, they end up leaning on international investors through 








The overall thread observed from the snapshot literature review is that the key pillars include 
participatory interest, legislation, high financial capital requirements and advanced 
technology requirements. The primary question then becomes: how have various actors 
across the value chain interacted or influenced the abovementioned key pillars to steer or 
determine participatory dynamics within the natural gas industry in Mozambique? 
2.4 Literature Review of Global Good Practice  
 
The Case for Natural Gas 
Globally, natural gas is increasingly being integrated by countries as a key component of 
industrial policy and development for a number of reasons. In the first instance, natural gas 
has la ower carbon footprint of up to 50 percent fewer emissions than coal per unit of 
electricity generated and 33 percent fewer emissions than coal per unit of heat generated5 
(IEA, 2019b). Natural gas also acts as a suitable transitionary fuel from coal to renewables 
by plugging the gap of intermittent6 renewable power (Smelcer, 2019).  
Natural gas also comes at a lower cost per oil barrel equivalent compared to diesel, however, 
it is still more expensive than coal-based on current technologies (IEA, 2019b). And finally, 
natural gas is about 39 percent more efficient than the oldest 50 percent of existing coal 
generation capacity, and in the case of the oldest coal-fired power plants, up to 60 percent 
more coal is required to generate the same unit of energy produced when compared to natural 
gas (IGU, 2020).    
 
Applications of Natural Gas 
In terms of end-user applications, countries such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and South Africa 
among others have utilised natural gas on the African continent for key developmental 
applications. These applications include gas to power projects (electricity), gas to industry 
(including the manufacture of Urea/fertiliser and various gas to liquids applications such as 
diesel and chemicals) and gas to residential applications such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG). 
South Africa as an example through the Sasol operations produces fertilizers for the 
agricultural market and liquid fuels for transport applications using natural gas (Sasol, 2020). 
 
5 Note: methane leaks must be managed to gain the full carbon footprint reduction benefits (IEA, 2019b). 
6 The good transitionary fuel attributes of natural gas are still relevant considering that energy storage 




In the south-eastern part of South Africa, Petro-SA through its the Mossel bay Gas to Liquids 
(GTL) refinery produces a series of liquid fuels and synthetic chemicals using a unique GTL 
Fischer Tröpsch technology (Petro-SA7, 2020). In Nigeria, gas has been utilised through 
organisations such as Shell Nigeria mostly for industrial customers. Key uses include gas as 
a feedstock for fertilizer and methanol production, industrial processes such as space heating, 
raising steam boilers and furnace operations as well as transportation applications through 
compressed natural gas (CNG) for vehicles that utilise CNG as the motive power fuel source 
(Shell Nigeria, 2020). In Tanzania, natural gas is currently being utilised for various gas to 
power projects fuelled by Songo Songo and Mnazi bay gas totaling some 423.5 MW in 
generation capacity. Processing plants at Songo Songo and Mnazi bay also feed a range of 
industries with gas feedstock for steel smelting applications, cement industries, fertilizer, 
and other chemical industries (Msaky, 2015).  
 
International Oil and Gas Law  
A range of laws collectively forms the body of law, commonly known as International Oil 
and Gas Law. This includes the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf which recognises 
a States sovereignty over its natural resources, United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) 
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 1962, and UN GA 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 and UN Resolution No. 626 (VII) 
on the right to freely exploit natural wealth. The UN resolutions accordingly afforded States 
the opportunity to fully utilise natural mineral resources for the benefit of the host country. 
Further provisions commonly adopted as international oil and gas standards are contained in 
legal documents such as the Energy Charter of 1994. This charter was originally signed 
between the then newly emerging former Soviet Union States of resource-rich Central Asia 
and Europe, as well as Japan, Russia and Turkey. Other countries such as Kenya have 












Oil and Gas Regulatory Frameworks 
Further to the aforementioned international prescripts, national-level laws governing oil and 
gas typically stem from the constitution of the host country, with specific oil and gas 
regulations espoused in the petroleum law (Boston Consulting Group [BCG], 2012). Figure 
2.3 below provides an overview of the generally accepted legal frameworks within which 
oil and gas resources are exploited globally.  
 
Figure 2.3: Oil and gas regulatory framework 
 
Source: BCG, 2012 
The accepted principles for good practice in the oil and gas sector were noted to usually 
cover matters such as methods of contracting, types of legislative frameworks, frameworks 
for petroleum taxation and environmental protection prescripts (Leuch, 2012). As illustrated 
in figure 2.3 above, countries typically enter into either concession contracts, production 










Concessions usually involve the host country granting rights to conduct certain activities on 
an exclusive or collaborative basis (Ernst & Young [EY], 2019). These activities could 
include exploration, production, or infrastructure development for the oil and gas resource. 
A key feature of this arrangement is that the concessionaire receives ownership of the oil 
and gas produced, which it may produce at its own risk and market freely at its own expense. 
Ownership typically transfers to the oil and gas company at the wellhead once the gas has 
been extracted (BCG, 2012). Depending on the provisions of the concession, the host 
country is compensated through various fiscal instruments which are discussed in the latter 
part of this section. 
 
Production Sharing Agreements 
Production sharing agreements involve the host country entering into a direct agreement with 
an oil and gas company. The oil and gas company conducts the upstream exploration and 
production activities and receives a certain proportion of the natural gas resource to recover 
its costs as well as a proportion of the profits from the sale of the natural gas (EY, 2019). A 
key distinguishing feature of this contract is that ownership of the gas produced is typically 
shared between the host country and the oil and gas company as per the contract provisions 
(BCG, 2012). This type of contract may also require the oil and gas company to compensate 
the host country through additional fiscal instruments.  
 
Services Contracts 
In the case of a services contract, the host country retains ownership of the resource, enters 
into an agreement with an oil and gas company to produce the oil for which a service fee is 
paid in addition to certain allowances to recover production costs. (EY, 2019). In this 
arrangement, the oil and gas company carries no risk or cost of exploration (BCG, 2012).  
 
Joint Ventures 
Finally, a joint venture (JV) approach is utilised in cases where the host country’s national 
hydrocarbons company has the original right to conduct the exploration and production 
activities. In this arrangement, the host country actively participates in the financing and 





In practice, governments may enter into various forms of the above-mentioned contracts 
with hybrid elements of one or the other. Key elements considered in making these decisions 
include the level of risk transfer for the development of the resource, ownership of gas 
produced, level of participation in operations, political stability, market maturity, and 
strategic developmental or commercial decisions taken by the host country (EY, 2019). 
 
Oil and Gas Fiscal Instruments 
In terms of financial benefits to the host country, depending on the specific provisions of the 
agreements, the host country is typically compensated through various fiscal instruments 
such as royalties, corporate income tax, production bonuses, windfall /extraordinary profit, 
tax and export duties. Use of the above fiscal instruments varies per country depending on 
the quality and volume of the resource found, complexity/ease of extracting the resource, 
and the negotiating power of the host country compared to the prospective oil and gas 
company. (United Nations, 2017). 
 
Taxes, Royalties, and Bonuses 
Profit taxes may come in the form of corporate income tax, windfall tax, or extraordinary 
profit taxes. Royalties, on the other hand, are generally calculated (in hard currency or 
molecules) as a proportion of the volume produced or the anticipated volume. Royalties are 
typically not calculated on the profit. Royalties may be considered as the purchase price or 
the natural oil and gas resource or the entitlement of the incumbent oil and gas company to 
ownership and sale of the resource produced (United Nations, 2017). Bonuses are often paid 
as fixed amounts for a particular event such as signature of the contract or commencement 
of production. Bonuses are useful instruments for host countries as they provide early 
income. Bonuses are also not calculated on the profits (United Nations, 2017). 
 It was noted however that realisation of some of these fiscal benefits could depend on the 
dynamics of whether participatory interest (equity) has been paid up or if the aforementioned 
financial benefits will initially be utilised to pay off the resource owner’s equity stake.  
Simply put, if the host country has not yet paid off its equity contribution, any compensation 
received from the oil and gas company will likely be utilised to pay off this debt as a first 






Table 2.1 Common fiscal instruments utilised to benefit the host country financially 
Stage of Resource 
Development 
Fiscal Instrument Instrument 
Characteristics 
Contract onset/signature Signature Bonus Fixed amount which may 
be calculated as a 
percentage of expected 
future income or resource 
value 




Royalties Payment on the value of 
the resource or proportion 
of the volume produced 
Production sharing  Proportion of production 
paid to the host country 
Profit taxes/Windfall taxes Taxes levied on 
income/profits generated 
for resource sales 




Environmental penalties/fees Taxes levied for pollution 
/externalities caused 
Source: United Nations, 2017 
 
Fiscal Instrument Peculiarities: Norway, Germany, Denmark Experience  
It was noted however that countries also enact and abolish certain specific legal provisions 
and fiscal instruments depending on their level of development, market maturity, resource 
ownership, fiscal requirements, and strategic national objectives. As an example, Norway as 
one of the leading oil and gas producers in the world abolished royalties on natural gas in 
the early 1990s (Leeberg, & Bernsten, 2019). The United Kingdom (U.K], Germany and 
Denmark likewise employ a fiscal regime which principally consists of corporate income 





Royalties typically impose an additional cost linked to revenues or production and not 
necessarily the size of the oil and gas fields or the development costs. Countries such as 
Norway and the U.K have thus abolished royalties in order to make it more economical to 
produce oil and gas from some of the smaller marginalised discoveries without the burden 
of royalties (bid). The manner in which countries enact or abolish certain legal prescripts for 
the oil and gas sector also in part reflects the level of development and market maturity 
within these jurisdictions in relation to ownership and control, where countries such as 
Norway own the majority of their oil and gas resources and would thus have a lower 
dependency on royalties compared to other developing African countries.  
 
Regional and International Perspectives on State Participation 
In terms of State participation, some insights into how other State-Owned Entities (SOEs) 
have gained better participation in the value chain illustrate the potential trajectories 
Mozambique could take.  
 
The Botswana Experience 
From a regional perspective, some lessons can be gleaned from countries such as Botswana. 
Although the context is marginally different, Botswana is as one of the regional economies 
that has managed to make progress in escaping trappings of the resource curse through 
appropriate governance and policy choices to utilise its mineral resource wealth (ANRC, 
2016). Although more still needs to be done by Botswana, it has made use of good 
institutional designs and appropriate fiscal and macroeconomic policies to gain 
developmental benefit from its mineral resources (diamonds).  
As defined further below, Initiatives such as the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, 
use of principles such as the Sustainability Budget (SBI) rule and the Hartwick-Solow rule, 








In terms of good fiscal policy, the government of Botswana took the approach which ensured 
that recurrent8 government spending was only financed with non-mineral resource revenues.  
Mineral resource revenues, on the other hand, were noted to either be saved in the State’s 
sovereign wealth fund or they were used to finance non-recurrent expenditure9 (Columbia 
University, 2013). It was noted however that mineral revenues were in some cases called 
upon to plug any shortfalls in the recurrent expenditure, but this was done in accordance 
with the SBI rule. SBI determines the ratio of recurrent expenditure to non-mineral revenues. 
In years were the SBI was greater than one, mineral revenues were called upon to plug the 
recurrent expenditure deficit (ANRC, 2016). In addition, Botswana generally followed the 
Hartwick-Solow rule of thumb which argued that a constant level of consumption could be 
sustained if the value of investment equaled the value of rents on extracted mineral resources 
at each point in time. This Implied that depletion of natural capital required a compensating 
increase in other forms of capital (Ibid). In other words, this rule implied that a country 
should make efforts to reinvest all mineral revenues in other productive assets as opposed to 
consumption.  
 
In addition to the expenditure of mineral resource revenue on non-recurrent such as capital 
equipment and infrastructure, Botswana has also classified investment in human capital and 
development (which includes education) as non-recurrent expenditure. The frame of logic 
from the government of Botswana was that investment in human capital development would 
also generate future income (Ibid). In pursuit of the developmental benefit from its mineral 
resources, one of the prominent uses of mineral resources revenue over the years was to keep 
the free education policy alive, particularly in times of budget deficits and political pressure 





8 Recurrent expenditure consists of public sector wages, consumables, maintenance costs, debt interest etc 
(ANRC, 2016). 
9 Non recurrent expenditure is defined as once-off capital items including capital equipment, equity injections 




The statistics in tables 2.2 and 2.3 below illustrate the impact of this mineral resource 
revenue investment in education. 
Table 2.2: Changes in primary school education indicators 
Primary education  1991 2009-14 % change 
No. of Schools 626 821 
31% 
No. of Pupils 298 812 340 065 
14% 
N. of Teachers 9 833 15 042 
53% 
Pupil/teacher ratio 30 23 
23% 
 
Table 2.3: Changes in secondary school education indicators 
Secondary education  1991 2009-14 % change 
No. of Schools 172 283 
65% 
No. of Pupils 73 909 172 669 
134% 
No. of Teachers 43 12 14 081 
227% 
Pupil/teacher ratio 17 12 
29% 
Sources: (ANRC, 2016) 
The Saudi Arabia Experience 
Looking further afield, a good starting point is an international oil and gas company called 
Saudi Aramco. This company is not only the largest State-owned oil and gas company in the 
world, but also the largest oil and gas company in the world. The origins of Saudi Aramco 
were the signature of a concession agreement between Saudi Arabia and a company called 
Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) in 1933. SOCAL was not a small company 
from any perspective. It was one of the largest and perhaps historically most significant 
enterprises in the United States of America, founded by J.D. Rockefeller under the Standard 
Oil Trust of Companies. As early as 1882, the Standard Oil Trust companies owned and 
operated over 90 percent of upstream, midstream and downstream oil assets in the United 




Sherman Act of 1980 because it was viewed as being too large, partaking in uncompetitive 
monopolistic behaviour and preventing other market entrants (ibid).  
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 below, the offshoot companies subsequently formed from this 
break-up are today large oil and gas multinationals in their own right, now known as 
Chevron, Exxon Mobil and BP. 
 
Figure 2.4: Evolution of Standard Oil 
 
Source: Visual Capitalist (2019). 
 
The local company managing the SOCAL concession was later renamed ARAMCO 
(Arabian American Oil Company) in the 1940s. In 1973, by leveraging capital raised from 
extensive crude oil sales in a booming oil industry, Saudi Arabia acquired a 25 percent stake 
in ARAMCO and further increased this to 100 percent by 1980. The company was then 
renamed Saudi Aramco in 1988 (Saudi Aramco, 2019). Based on this history, it is clear that 
the origin of the SOE now known as Saudi Aramco was not an enterprise organically grown 
from within the State. Instead, it was transplanted from one of the most highly commercial 
and profitable private oil and gas companies in the United States of America and worldwide. 
The second key component was the underlying burgeoning crude oil industry and extensive 
crude oil sales that allowed Saudi Aramco to invest and grow the company into the oil and 





The conceptual framework explains how the study is organised, specifically the relationship 
between key input variables and the associated outputs. 
 
The first two key input variables which have a direct relationship are the applicable laws and 
concession contracts. Given the research question aims to determine whether Mozambique 
could gain greater participation in an environment where existing laws and contracts are in 
force, the starting point is to critically analyse the provisions of the current laws vis-a-vis 
greater participation in the natural gas value chain. The significance of this assessment is 
that laws create the organisational framework to distribute and allocate the mineral resources 
benefits between various actors. Prescripts contained within the laws thus provide a 
viewpoint of the level and extent to which the host country will be empowered to gain greater 
participation in the value chain. The extension of this analysis is also to interrogate previous 
and future natural gas projects through the lens of the concession contracts to determine what 
transpired in practice in relation to provisions of the laws and what is currently planned as 
enshrined in the future contracts.  
 
This initial assessment provides the groundwork that determines if recommendations are 
contained within or should be prescribed apart from the existing legal and contractual 
framework and if freedom to make such provisions or recommendations is apparent in the 
current laws and contracts. The relevance of the historical analysis is to create a baseline 
from which to commence a discussion about additionality.  
 
Figure 2.5: Conceptual framework  
 
Source: Author’s construction 
Petroleum Laws Concession Contracts










The third key element of the conceptual framework relates to the key inputs/determinants 
that affect the ability of the host country to gain greater participation in the value chain. Key 
determinants such as financing and technical capability are critical to the framework of 
greater participation, providing entry points or creating blockages to achieve greater 
involvement in the value chain.  
 
Within these key elements, specific subthemes are analysed as they create the frame and core 
arguments of how Mozambique could gain greater participation. These include financing 
prescripts, legislation, skills and experience. The culmination of these could be the 
measurement of greater participation through changes in critical macroeconomic data such 
as gross domestic product. The interaction of the above core elements of the conceptual 
framework create guidelines to interrogate whether greater participation is possible for 
Mozambique in the natural gas value chain.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the literature review provided perspectives that illustrate the theories 
introduced by other authors in the research area as well as empirical literature generated to 
validate or disprove various theories. Finally, the literature provided some insights into good 
practice, both in terms of participation of some of the leading SOEs in the natural gas 
















CHAPTER THREE: MOZAMBIQUE GAS  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two provided a broad review of the available theoretical and empirical literature 
creating an analytical framework for assessing how Mozambique could potentially gain 
greater participation in its natural gas value chain. Chapter three now proceeds to provide a 
more detailed analysis of specific elements of historic natural gas projects executed by 
Mozambique, the relevant contracts and legal frameworks as well as some discussion of the 
technical and institutional capacity demands surrounding the execution of these projects.  
3.2 The Journey to First Gas  
Oil and gas exploration activities started in Mozambique as far back as the early 1900s 
through explorers that discovered thick sedimentary basins onshore of Mozambique 
(Instituto Nacional de Petróleo [INP], 2014). Similar to other African countries, however, 
exploration activities ground to a halt due to poor technological advancements and 
exploration methods and the resulting high cost (Ibid). Exploration resumed from 1948 
onwards through international oil companies, culminating in the discovery of the Pande gas 
field by Gulf Oil in 1961 and subsequent discoveries at Buzi in 1962 and Temane discoveries 
in 1956 (OECD, 2019; World Bank, 2003; INP, 2014). In the period that ensued, the fight 
for independence commenced in 1964, with independence being attained in 1975, however, 
civil war followed in 1976 (Roque, 2014), Exploration activities thus declined in the 1970s 
due to the political unrest from the civil war only to resume in the early 1980s through the 
establishment of the first Mozambique State-owned hydrocarbons company, Empresa 
Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) through law No. 3 of 1981. (INP, 2014) 
3.3 Technical and Institutional Capacity Demands 
Subsequent to the civil war, peace agreement discussions commenced in 1992 culminating 
in the first Mozambique democratic elections in 1994 (Roque, 2014). This was accompanied 
by the advances in exploration technologies that saw direct hydrocarbon indicators being 
used to map the Pande field and later the Temane field (INP, 2014). Having come out of a 
civil war, Mozambique needed to build infrastructure, institutions, and the very social fabric 
of the nation from the bottom up. With positive prospects of a potentially viable commercial 
discovery at Pande-Temane, a key challenge was the lack of technical and institutional 




In years leading up to the finalisation of the Pande-Temane negotiations for production of 
the first gas, the World Bank as a key financing partner made inroads in assisting the 
government to start creating a legislative and policy framework for the energy sector in 
Mozambique (World Bank, 2018).  The various reforms introduced by the government had 
the effect of converting key energy sector parastatals (Electricidade de Moçambique [EDM], 
ENH, Petróleos De Moçambique [PETROMOC]) into corporate entities operating within 
the framework of the new laws (Ibid).  The reforms also sought to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of various energy sector institutions. As an example, the national directorate 
for coal and hydrocarbons was mandated to provide oversight to the upstream oil and gas 
sector while the national directorate for energy was mandated to provide oversight for 
midstream and downstream activities (World Bank, 2003).   
 
In 2000, the government published its energy strategy which among other principles, 
recognized the limited institutional and skills capacity within the country’s energy industry. 
The strategy also emphasized decisions by the government to leverage external technical 
capacity assistance for negotiation and development of large energy capital projects such as 
Pande-Temane while in parallel developing the government’s own internal capacity (World 
Bank, 2018). Other external technical support and capacity was also received from 
experienced oil and gas players such as Norway in the development of treaties and trade 
agreements which paved the way for the establishment of a Mozambique to South Africa 
gas pipeline for the Pande-Temane gas (OECD, 2019). Norway also provided extensive 
petroleum technical assistance to Mozambique starting as far back as the early 90s (Norad, 
2018). In the Pande-Temane era, Norway provided specific support to the INP to support 
with key elements such as strengthening institutional capacity and the regulatory framework, 
as well as extensive training of geophysicists, geologists, lawyers, and economists to manage 
a range of activities in the oil and gas sector (Norad, 2011). The lack of adequate institutional 
capacity and specialist human resources capability at the time of the Pande-Temane project 
also drew the need for guarantees from IBRD10 and MIGA11 in order to protect financiers 
from political risk for the gas project while the government was in the process of creating 
and strengthening the necessary policy and regulatory frameworks.  
 
 
10 IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 




3.4 Pande-Temane Beginnings 
Following the journey of creating the initial laws, regulations and policy frameworks, 
commercial production of natural gas in the Pande-Temane fields started in 2004 laying the 
foundations for an early roadmap to how, in what form, and to what extent Mozambique 
would participate in its natural gas value chain. Commercial development of the 
approximately 2 TCF of proven natural gas reserves in Pande-Temane also laid the ground-
work for various improvements in the legislative frameworks that would later govern oil and 
gas developments in Mozambique and its associated participation in the natural gas value 
chain. According to the (INP, 2019), a Petroleum Production Agreement (PPA) was signed 
between Sasol, the government of Mozambique, Empresa Nacional De Hidrocarbonetos 
(ENH) and its subsidiary, Companhia Moçambicana de Hidrocarbonetos (CMH) in October 
2000. The agreement principally entailed exploration and construction of a Central 
Processing Facility (CPF) in Mozambique to produce approximately 72 million gigajoules 
per annum (mGj/pa) of gas at inception in 2004, ramping up to 120 mGj/pa in 2009, and 
later increasing to over 183 mGj/pa (World Bank, 2003). The PPA also covered the 
establishment of an 865km pipeline to transport the gas produced from Pande-Temane to the 
Sasol Secunda plant in South Africa.  
 
In terms of the value chain, there were three key components to the project. Firstly, upstream 
which included exploration and production from the gas fields, secondly, midstream which 
included transmission of the gas through the pipeline, and lastly, downstream which included 
operations at Secunda (South Africa) for in-house use of the gas by Sasol and subsequent 
distribution to its end-users. As illustrated in Figure 3.1 below, from a value chain 
participation perspective, Sasol (through its Mozambique subsidiary – Sasol Petroleum 
Temane [SPT]) was the designated operator of the gas fields under the PPA signed in 2000 
with ENH and the government of Mozambique. In practice, this meant that Sasol was 
responsible for the execution of all production activities in the upstream portion of the value 
chain.  The role of the operator is typically taken by the party capable of best managing the 
technological, operational and financial risk associated with the successful commercial 
production of the natural gas. The percentage of participatory interest (equity) in the 
concession is also a key determinant of how roles and responsibilities are allocated across 
the value chain. In the case of Pande-Temane, Sasol originally had a 70 percent participatory 




Five per cent of Mozambique’s portion was later assigned to the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) as part of a financing deal (World Bank, 2013). In practical terms, this 
meant that Sasol was in effect entitled to, or allocated 70 percent of the obligations, risks 
and ultimately the benefits from the natural gas development project.  
 
Figure 3.1: Pande-Temane project structure  
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003:22 
 
In terms of participation in this value chain, Mozambique maintained its 25 percent 
participatory interest in the upstream activities (albeit with Sasol being the operator). Within 
the midstream part of the value chain, the vehicle used to execute the pipeline project was a 
new Mozambique registered company entitled: Republic of Mozambique Pipeline 
Investments Company (Pty) Limited (ROMPCO), initially 100% owned by Sasol. In terms 
of the midstream section of the value chain, although the pipeline was owned and operated 
100 percent by Sasol at inception, the Central Energy Fund (CEF) representing the 
government of South Africa and Companhia Moçambicana de Gasoduto (CMG) 
representing the government of Mozambique had the option to acquire an aggregate of up to 
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3.5 Mozambique Rovuma Basin Discoveries 
After the discovery of the Pande-Temane fields, Mozambique further discovered what are 
now argued to be the third-largest natural gas finds in Africa after Nigeria and Algeria and 
twelfth in the world (IMF, 2019). It is estimated that between 150-200 TCF of natural gas 
were discovered off the shore of Mozambique's Rovuma basin in the Northern Cabo Delgado 
province by oil & gas majors, Anadarko and ENI (Standard Bank, 2019a). Discoveries from 
the Area 1 block by Anadarko were estimated by Standard Bank (2014) to potentially 
generate up between 10-12 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of liquid natural gas LNG for 
the first phase. The Anadarko project reached the Final Investment Decision (FID12) in 2019. 
In the same period (2019), all of Anadarko’s assets in Africa were taken over by the oil major 
Total, including the interest in Area 1 (Standard Bank, 2019a). According to Standard 2019b, 
the Area 4 natural gas project by ENI consists of two key projects. The first was an offshore 
natural gas project termed “Coral South” with an estimated production capacity of 3,4mtpa 
of LNG and the second was an onshore project with an estimated production capacity of up 
to 15,2 mtpa of LNG for the first phases financed under a project finance structure. The 
Coral South project declared FID in 2017, while the onshore project declared FID in 2019. 
For the Area 4 discovery, part of the ENI Stake (35,7%) was sold to Exxon Mobile in 2019. 
Subsequently, ENI and Exxon took up a joint role as operator of the Area 4 discovery 
(Standard Bank, 2019a).  
3.6 Mozambique Natural Gas Legislation 
Over the years, a series of laws have been enacted by Mozambique to govern the natural gas 
industry, most of which have had subsequent revisions and updates as the level of knowledge 
and experience of Mozambique increased with each discovery and the commercial 
production of natural gas. Key laws governing the sector which the literature review 
focussed on include the Petroleum and Mega-Projects Laws in Mozambique. These laws 
guide the expected level and extent of participation of Mozambique in its natural gas value 
chain. Within this assessment, there are some broad comparisons made to comparable/peer 
legislation from Ghana and South Africa to obtain a view of how Mozambique fares on a 
regional scale before considering how to achieve greater participation. The framework used 
to conduct the comparison was based on the key elements of participation to determine how 
 
12 Final Investment Decision (FID) represents a key project milestone of securing all required financial 




Mozambique compared to its peers, bearing in mind the varying economic and social profiles 
of each country. The focus is particularly on the fundamental metrics that depict and are 
relevant to achieving greater participation of the host country in the natural gas value chain.  
3.7 Mozambique Petroleum Law  
Some initial insights to the participation of Mozambique in its natural gas value chain can 
be gleaned through what is commonly termed the "Petroleum Law" in Mozambique. This 
law was originally promulgated as Law 3 of 1981 before being superseded by Law 3 of 2001 
and finally Law 21 of 2014. This was done in order to align the legal framework for 
petroleum activities to the evolving economic, social and political developments in the 
petroleum sector (Petroleum Law No. 21 of 2014). In principle, the Petroleum Law 
established the general rules of engagement for the execution of petroleum activities in 
Mozambique.  
3.8 State Participation in Concessions Provisions 
An analysis of the Mozambique Petroleum Law as it relates to value chain participation 
revealed that the defined role of the State is that of participating across all parts of the value 
chain from upstream to downstream to ensure the promotion of national development 
(Petroleum Law No. 21 of 2014). Article 20 of Law 21 of 2014 addresses State participation 
in the value chain, specifically stipulating that "the State reserves the right to participate in 
any section of the petroleum operations".  
The Act articulates that such participation is to be agreed in the contract with the 
Concessionaires. There is also an option for the State to progressively increase its 
participation in petroleum operations (ibid).  
 
The Mozambique Petroleum Law as a guiding framework does stipulate that any investor 
interested in exploration shall do so in partnership with ENH as the Mozambique State 
representative in the petroleum sector. This essentially makes provision for participation of 
ENH in the upstream sector. However, details of how this would be executed are only 
defined in the exploration and production concession contracts. When comparing these 
Mozambique provisions to petroleum legislation in Ghana, they are similar in that any 
prospective petroleum investor in Ghana must enter into a partnership with the government 
of Ghana and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation [GNPC] (Petroleum Exploration 




In the case of South Africa’s petroleum laws, no specific provisions require a potential 
investor to enter into a partnership with the State (Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development [MRPDA] Act, No. 28 of 2002 as amended 2009). The current South African 
MRPDA amendment bill of 2013, however, makes some new proposals with provisions for 
the State to have guaranteed participation in petroleum contracts. At the time of writing of 
this dissertation, this amendment bill was yet to be enacted into South African law. 
3.9 Domestic Gas Allocation Provisions 
Within Mozambique’s Petroleum Laws, provisions for domestic gas (which can be 
considered a key vehicle to participate in the downstream sector of the value chain) are 
contained in Article 35 of Law 21 of 2014, stipulating that no less than 25% of all gas 
produced must be for the domestic market. It is important to note that when the first 
commercial natural gas project took place in Mozambique, the Pande-Temane project in 
2000, this provision in the Petroleum Law did not exist. It was only through after-the-fact 
negotiations that some domestic gas was provided to ENH for local use in Mozambique, 
principally through receipt of the petroleum tax "in-kind" as gas as opposed to receipt as 
cash. According to Human (2019), Mozambique received an estimated 30 mGj/a during the 
Pande-Temane project.  
 
When contrasted with laws in Ghana, at the writing of this dissertation, 100% of all, natural 
gas produced in Ghana is allocated to the domestic market while 100% of the crude oil 
produced is for export (Adadzi & Amamoo, 2019). The South African laws, in contrast, do 
not make express provisions for domestic allocation in the original MPRDA Act 28 of 2002 
as amended in 2009. 
3.10 Mozambique Mega-Projects Law 15 of 2011  
Further definition of prescripts governing the extent, scope and scale of Mozambique’s 
participation in the natural gas value chain are enshrined under the "Mega-Projects" Law 15 
of 2011 which governs public-private partnerships, large-scale projects and business 
concessions. The intention of Law 15 of 2011 is to recognise the need to ensure that the 
efficiency of capital and technology deployment for large-scale projects is not inhibited and 
the State must participate in the projects to ensure the population benefits from the country’s 




The legislation thus intends to allow greater involvement of private sector finance, 
technology and expertise, while ensuring the equal, efficient provision of goods, services 
and benefits to society (Mega-Projects Law No. 15 of 2011). 
 
Although these two central objectives are not mutually exclusive, the mechanism and 
approach to executing on them through the concessions is the difference between one 
objective outweighing the other in terms of substantive implementation and recognition. The 
implementation is accordingly produced through the exploration production and concession 
contracts which ostensibly interpret the legislation and attempt to abide by its prescripts 
while simultaneously balancing the interests of the two key parties to the contract – the 
private investor/operator and government of Mozambique.  
3.11 Participatory Interest Provisions 
In relation to sharing of mineral resources benefits, the Mozambique Petroleum Law further 
makes provision for allocating benefits based on the quantity and quality of the resources 
made available for the natural gas project by each party (Mega-Projects Law No. 15 of 2011). 
This could be interpreted to demonstrate the importance of the participatory interest (equity) 
which translates into the proportion of expenses covered for development and operations, as 
well as the share of benefits received between the private developer and government. 
Furthermore, the degree of responsibility undertaken by each party is also a critical 
consideration for the allocation of benefits (ibid). Mozambique Law 15 of 2011 prescribes 
that the State must possess no less than 5% and no more than 20% of share capital or equity 
in the development (the participatory interest). There is, however, no further specification of 
how the participation of the State is further secured across the various parts of the value 
chain.  
 
The literature review revealed that the mechanics of how the Concessionaire spreads itself 
across the value chain has by default been left to the party with the allocated responsibility 
of "operator" which coincides with the party that has a higher participatory interest in the 
development (Petroleum Operations Law No. 2 of 2014: 96).  
As a result, because the specific participation at various levels of the value chain is not 
quantified, the default position is that decisions are controlled by the party with the greater 
participatory interest and corresponding expense carrying allocation. This could be 




to the concession, which in the case of the current concessions could be argued to be very 
little, given the high cost of securing the State's participatory interest. Standard Bank (2019) 
estimates that the peak funding required for all of ENH's participatory interest (equity) 
obligations will potentially reach up to USD 11-12 billion by 2029 (Standard Bank 2019). 
Concessions concluded in Area 4 specifically stipulate, however, that the other parties 
involved must finance ENH's equity component to be repaid by ENH when commercial 
production begins (ENI Area 4 Contract, 2006: 20).  
 
When compared to regional legislation, petroleum laws in Ghana stipulate that no less than 
15% of participatory interest must be allocated to the State (Petroleum E&P Act of 2016). 
In the case of South Africa, the current MRPDA Act 28 of 2002 and its associated 
amendment of 2009 makes no specific provision for how much participatory interest is for 
the State. However, the amendment bill of 2013 makes provision for a 20% free carry 
participatory interest for the State with options to acquire additional interests at an agreed 
price (MRPDA Act, No. 28 of 2002 as amended 2009; MRPDA Amendment Bill, B15D of 
2013). These prescripts that relate to responsibility and allocation of risks/rewards are 
important to the value chain debate, as they recognise the significant role of how much 
participatory interest a State secures and the link to subsequent sharing of benefits and 
obligations that accrue to the State. 
3.12 Skills Development and Technology Transfer Provisions 
Finally, consideration must be given to laws concerning technology transfer and skills 
development. Matters relating to technology are relevant in that they could be key with 
regards to creating a capability that can progressively allow greater State participation in 
more complex parts of the value chain. From a capacity-building perspective, Mozambique’s 
Law 15 of 2011 makes general reference to the need for transfer of know-how and 
technology and promotion of greater economic inclusion for Mozambicans in natural gas 
projects as well as the development of national capital markets (Mega-Projects Law No. 15 
of 2011). There also appears to be a generalised reference to the need for the Concessionaire 
to cater for training and development, and creation of export capacity and internal market 
needs; however, there are no specific provisions for embedding the State as a participant in 





Those above can be compared to Ghana, which has a fully-fledged separate and stand-alone 
law within the petroleum sector regulating indigenous participation, skills and technology 
transfer. Ghana’s local content and local participation regulations of 2013 were specifically 
enacted to ensure the maximum participation of the host country and its indigenous 
inhabitants, increasing local expertise and experience and also safeguard against the interest 
of foreign participants in the oil and gas sector. Ghana’s local participation laws also further 
identify specific services for oil and gas which can only be sourced from Ghana, such as 
legal services (Petroleum Local Content and Participation Regulations Act of 2013). The 
Ghanaian local content laws also request detailed plans for training, research, development, 
technology transfer, legal and financial services as an essential requirement for execution of 
natural gas projects (Adadzi & Godson-Amamoo, 2019) 
 
In the case of South Africa, provisions are indeed made for local content within natural gas 
projects with calls for what is classified as substantive and meaningful participation of 
previously marginalised persons, including women and local communities through the 
expansion of opportunities in the petroleum sector (MRPDA Act, No. 28 of 2002 as amended 
2009).  
3.13 Enforcement of Contract Provisions and Regulations  
Within the limitations of what Mozambique managed to negotiate in the Pande-Temane 
contract and the existing laws at the time, the general observation was that there was 
adherence to the contract provisions and regulations as agreed between the parties. A key 
factor in this ability to ensure the enforcement of the contract provisions and regulations was 
likely the external capacity support which Mozambique leaned on through partners such as 
the World Bank, the Norwegian government, and indeed Sasol.   
 
The technical engineering components of the project were noted to have been completed on 
time and within the engineering specifications. (World Bank, 2013; World Bank 2018).  In 
terms of environmental provisions, the World Bank noted that the project was implemented 
within the limits of its environmental and social safeguards. In particular, Sasol was noted 
to have provided the required annual integrated disclosure reports including full audits of the 






From the financial management perspective, Sasol was observed to have been compliant 
with the World Bank’s fiduciary reporting requirements in line with international fiduciary 
reporting expected from a company of its nature listed publicly on the Johannesburg and 
New York Stock exchange (Ibid). Both Sasol Pande-Temane (SPT) and ROMPCO were 
noted to have provided adequate financial reporting in line with petroleum operations 
requirements, including the use of competitive procurement for all major contracts such as 
the Central Processing Facility (CPF) and the ROMCO Pipeline (Ibid).  
 
In terms of job creation requirements enshrined in the contracts and regulations, the key 
observation was that significant short-term employment opportunities were created, 
however, there was limited direct long-term employment. As an example, an estimated 3200 
temporary jobs were created during the construction phase with over 50 percent being filled 
by Mozambican nationals.  As of 2018, however, an estimated 200 local nationals were 
observed to be employed on a permanent basis across Sasol’s Mozambique operations (Ibid). 
Fulfilment of obligations on the part of Sasol for local community development was 
observed to have some strengths and weaknesses despite notable efforts being exerted. As 
an example, although as of 2017, Sasol had invested an estimated USD33 Million in 
community development projects, these focused mostly on the establishment of 
infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and water supply. While commendable, the efforts 
lacked sustainability due to lack of trained personnel to sustainably run these facilities [e.g 
well-trained teachers, health care workers, and engineers] (Ibid). It can be debated as to 
whether the responsibility was on the government or Sasol to ensure the training of personnel 
to operate various infrastructure which was established. Overall, World Bank Programmes 
which formed a key part of the technical assistance package for Pande-Temane such as the 
Energy Reform and Access Project (ERAP), Gas engineering Project, IFC support for gas 
distribution among others were instrumental in assisting Mozambique. These programmes 
supported the creation of internal capacity for project development, contract negotiations, 
policy, regulatory and institutional design for the Pande-Temane project and indeed laying 







3.14 Conclusion  
In summary, among other intentions, the Mozambique Petroleum Laws, when compared to 
regional laws, provided a broad framework through which new laws could be instituted to 
further guide participation of Mozambique across the natural gas value chain as the host 
country. A key question to be asked concerning the adequacy of State participation however 
is whether the provisions in the Mozambique Petroleum Law were sufficient, or if firmer, 
more concrete prescripts were necessary. The issue of adequate participation of the State, in 
essence, starts at the level of the Laws, however, if these are not sufficiently robust, 
subsequent efforts become merely a patch work of interventions to try and attain greater 





CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of the study was to determine whether Mozambique could gain greater 
participation from its natural gas value chain.  
 
Secondary research objectives included the following: 
• To understand the history of Mozambique’s participation in its natural gas value 
chain.  
• To determine the legislative frameworks that are in place to help Mozambique 
achieve greater participation from its natural gas value chain. 
• To determine concession contract provisions relevant to participation in the value 
chain. 
• To determine barriers that hinder achievement of greater participation in the natural 
gas value chain.  
4.2 Research Design 
 
A case study approach investigated the research objective to examine the underlying 
complexity of the issues. Simons (2009) supports this notion stipulating that this approach 
allows for the detailed exploration of information and narratives from multiple perspectives 
and takes into account the complexity and uniqueness of a particular policy, project, 
programme, institution or system within its context. Harrison, Birks, Franklin and Mills 
(2017) agree stipulating that this methodological approach is particularly useful to better 
understand the complex relationships between institutions, practices and processes.  
 
The literature review conducted revealed that both quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies have been utilised for previous studies on this subject. There is available 
research using quantitative research methodologies on the topics of natural gas project 
financing, ownership and resource-based industrialisation. These studies used survey and 
statistical modelling research methods. Quantitative research methods can be advantageous 
where there is a need to measure variables such as how much, how many, and to what extent 




best represented and analysed as frequencies whose associations with each other can be 
studied using statistical and other numerical techniques (ibid). In the case of this research 
study, a qualitative research design was selected given that the nature of the research 
objectives did not depend on analysis of statistical data to support the arguments made in the 
research findings, but rather, contextual analysis from applicable laws, contracts and 
historical project developments. For qualitative research, the collection of data and its 
analysis is sensitive to the context within which it occurs and aims to provide a holistic 
understanding of the subject. In contrast, quantitative research is more suited to structured, 
standardised and abstracted modes of conducting empirical data analysis (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2011).  
 
For this study, the qualitative research method was the most appropriate as it aims to produce 
rich, nuanced and well-rounded perspectives (Button, 2019). The qualitative research 
method is well suited for investigations into laws, contracts, organisations and policies – all 
four of which were key elements of this study (ibid). Limited time and resources available 
were also contributing factors to applying the qualitative method. By nature of the research 
objectives and core tenants, an inductive approach was selected for this qualitative study.  
4.3 Research Scope 
The study was based on applied research in the field of mineral resources management. The 
research covered SOEs involved in demand and supply of natural gas, private companies 
engaged in concessions for production and exploration of natural gas, key State institutions 
involved in regulation and oversight of the natural gas sector and financial institutions 
concerned with the financing of natural gas projects.  
 
As illustrated in figure 4.1, the geographic scope was limited to Mozambique and sector 
scope to natural gas. Analysis of natural gas blocks was limited to the following geographic 
areas:  
- Pande -Temane; and 








Figure 4.1 Research geographic scope 
 
Source: Human, 2019 
4.4 Research Methods 
Flick (2007) emphasises that a qualitative research method makes use of text as empirical 
evidence (as opposed to numbers). This is demonstrated in the methods used in this study 
wherein within the case study methodology, the specific “text” or information required for 
the core arguments was extracted from the relevant laws and contracts which give insights 
into the prescripts for participation dynamics in the natural gas value chain. Secondary 
information on best practices within the industry was required to assess how other countries 




















Flick (2007) also articulates that qualitative research is specifically concerned with views of 
participants, in daily practice and knowledge. Expert opinions through interviews provided 
the additional supporting evidence, principally to support the arguments generated from 
analysis of the laws, contracts and best practice as well as to contextualise and give expert 
insights into the findings.  
 
In order to obtain the core data required for the research objectives, key information sources 
included online resources such as State information portals, university library portals, private 
company information portals and written correspondence with experts. Secondary 
information from expert opinions was obtained through interviews.  
4.5 Target Population 
The target population included State Owned Entities (SOEs) tasked with managing the 
natural gas projects for each respective country. The population also included multinational 
oil and gas companies with direct involvement on the private sector concessionaire side of 
the transactions, specifically, respondents with knowledge of the technical and commercial 
aspects. Finally, the population included organisations with direct and on-going knowledge 
of the financing of the natural gas projects including private and public sector banks, insurers 
and private equity investors. 
4.6 Sampling 
For the expert interviews, purposive non-probability sampling was utilised given that the 
approach was not to obtain a representative sample, rather, to obtain specific insights from 
experts that aligned with particular characteristics unique to the research objectives. 
Saunders et al. (2016: 297) provide some guidance regarding the appropriate sample size 
and response rate where non-probability sampling is utilised based on a semi-structured 
interview as in this dissertation.  
 
For all non-probability sampling techniques, other than for quota samples, the issue 
of sample size is ambiguous, and, unlike probability sampling, there are no rules. 
Rather the logical relationship between your sample selection technique and the 
purpose and focus of your research is important, generalisations being made to 





In relation to response rates, Saunders et al. (2016: 441) articulate the following for likely 
web and mobile questionnaire response rates: “variable to low response rates of 30%-50% 
are reasonable for web within organisations, otherwise, they can be 10% or even lower.” 
 
A sampling frame was not particularly relevant given the use of purposive/criterion sampling 
for the expert interviews. The sampling frame was also not found to be relevant because of 
the limited number of interviews conducted to obtain in-depth expert opinions for the 
specific respondents. 
 
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of the main criteria utilised to filter and identify target 
respondents and organisations under the purposive sampling method.  
 




Scope of involvement Types of individuals 
SOEs directly 
involved in the 
Mozambique value 
chain 
- Institutions involved in demand-
side production, transportation 
and distribution of gas 
- Institutions that cover regulatory 
functions of natural gas  
- Institutions involved in supply-
side dynamics 
Executive Manager, COO 
or CEO level (current or 
former) 
Financial institutions 
directly involved in 
current or previous 
natural projects  
- Institutions providing, debt, 
equity or political risk cover to 




legal or commercial 
knowledge of natural gas 
projects in Mozambique 
and globally 
Oil majors (large 
multinational oil and 
gas companies) 
currently or 
previously involved in 
Mozambique natural 
gas projects as well as 
global gas projects in 
general 
- Current or former 
Concessionaires 
- Global players in the natural gas 
space 







Interview requests were sent via the web (email). Once confirmed, the interviews were 
conducted telephonically or as face-to-face interviews. The researcher travelled to Maputo, 
Mozambique to conduct some of the interviews with the identified respondents. All other 
interviews were conducted telephonically with respondents headquartered in South Africa.  
 
A semi-structured set of questions allowed flexibility in the answers to the research questions 
as well as discussion of any unexpected critical topics during the interviews. Each interview 
was between 45–60 minutes. Meticulous notes were taken for each interview. The 
respondents were also engaged after the interview for essential follow-up information as 
required to meet the research objectives.   
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the information and language barriers, interviews were 
challenging to secure. To overcome the language barrier, the researcher identified 
respondents who spoke English in Mozambique. In total, 15 experts were approached, but 
only seven successfully interviewed. The demographics of the respondents are summarised 
in table 4.2 below. 
 











R1 Director Technical, institutional and 
commercial knowledge of 
current and previous 






R2 CEO Technical, institutional and 
commercial knowledge of 
current and previous 



















R3 COO Technical, institutional and 
commercial knowledge of 
current and previous 
Mozambique natural gas 
projects 
Midstream >20 Years 
R4 Executive 
Manager 
Technical, institutional and 
commercial knowledge of 
current and previous 
Mozambique natural gas 
projects 





















Technical, institutional and 
commercial knowledge of 
previous Mozambique 
natural gas projects 
Midstream >40 Years 
     
 
4.8 Research Instrument 
 
Research instruments utilised to collect information in response to the research objectives 
were the following:  
- Document review of relevant laws and concession contracts 




4.9 Analysis and Findings 
The approach to conducting the analysis and presentation of data commenced with a detailed 
look at comparable or peer legislation within South Africa and Ghana. These legislative 
frameworks were assessed as part of the literature review to obtain a basis for how other 
similar oil and gas producing nations on the continent can be compared against Mozambique. 
A detailed assessment of the Mozambique laws determined the provisions encapsulated in 
this legislation aimed at fostering greater participation. A broad comparison compared the 
South African and Ghanaian legislation against Mozambican legislation.  
 
On a practical level to identify potential entry points where Mozambique could potentially 
gain a greater benefit, demand and supply, financing, commercialisation and domestic gas 
strategies were assessed.  
 
Leaning on the above analysis framework, feedback from the expert interviews provided 
context and ideas for potential entry points. Expert interviews were particularly significant 
to provide practical ideas based on experience within project execution, financing, 
institutional structuring and legislation for natural gas projects.  
 
4.10 Limitations of the Study 
Although the study area broadly relates to public policy for mineral resources management, 
the detailed analysis was limited to energy resources and more specifically, natural gas. The 
study did not cover casual relationships between other mineral resources such as coal, iron 
ore and diamonds and the ability of countries to extract higher value from these mineral 
resource clusters. 
 
Another limitation of this study was the fact that Africa is not one country, instead 54 
countries with varying political, social and political nuances. Extrapolation of the results of 
this study can thus only be limited to the core principles and fundamental arguments. As an 
example, the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique with regards to the natural 
gas pipeline established is unique to this bilateral relationship. However, the principle of 
domestic gas and a need for more provision to have been made for Mozambique to benefit 
as the supplying country compared to South Africa as the receiving country can be 




Another limitation noted was the analysis conducted on the concession contracts for 
Mozambique. Firstly, the analysis was limited to those concession contracts that reached 
FID and either completed, started or were in the process of commencing construction 
activities. The analysis of concessions was also restricted to understanding how they 
implemented the legislative prescripts for ensuring adequate participation of the country in 
the natural gas value chain. As an example, a specific analysis of the extent of the need for 
training, skills and technology transfer was recognised and implemented through 
concessions was examined, however, elements such as differences in varying tax regimes 
between concessions with no material bearing on participation were not analysed. 
 
Another limitation was that greater participation of Mozambique in the value chain is 
broadly defined to include the State, local private sector and local communities. The 
dissertation did not provide analysis specific to each element. This aspect was noted as an 
area for future study in terms of core policies and frameworks specific to the State, local 
private sector and community participation. The dissertation thus provided perspectives on 
Mozambique as a whole concerning how the country could gain greater participation.  
 
The final limitation of this study was that due to the time and resources constraints, and the 
study focused on a qualitative assessment of the central question whether Mozambique could 
potentially gain more significant benefit from its natural gas value chain. The study did not 
cover the potential quantum of what such potential benefit would be if it was achieved.  
Such quantification requires an entirely separate study utilising a quantitative empirical 
approach and possibly modelling techniques to extrapolate the value of potential benefit 
across multiple variables. Accordingly, this was noted as an area for future study. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research design, approach and methodology as discussed in this chapter 









CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis and findings from the research conducted. In terms of the 
historic projects analysis, focus was placed on the Pande-Temane project (Sasol concession), 
Area 1 project (Anardako13 – now Total concession), and Area 4 project (ENI14 – now Exxon 
Mobil concession). The analysis on legislative frameworks focused principally on the 
petroleum law of Mozambique (Law 21 of 2014) and Mega-Projects law (Law 15 of 2011). 
The analysis of research objective three focussed on the Pande-Temane concession, Area 1 
and Area 4 concession contracts. Finally, the analysis of research objective four focused on 
key entry points for greater participation, including financing dynamics, domestic gas and 
skills development.  
5.2 Research Objective 1: Findings on the history of Mozambique’s participation in its 
natural gas value chain. 
 
The research revealed that Mozambique could have had greater participation in its first 
natural gas project, the Pande-Temane Sasol concession. As respondent 3 put it, "It can be 
debated as to whether Mozambique gave the gas away too cheaply, or if they could have 
gotten a better deal". The answer to whether Mozambique provided the gas too cheaply is 
somewhat complex in that there were many factors at play in the Pande-Temane project. In 
the first instance, Mozambique had just emerged from a civil war with an impoverished and 
struggling economy desperately dependent on foreign aid. As such, any prospect of 
generating additional fiscal revenue would have been attractive. In the second instance, the 
gas that was discovered by Sasol was to an extent "stranded gas" with no readily available 
domestic market, and there was a high probability that if Mozambique did not take the terms 
proposed by Sasol, the gas could have remained in the ground for much longer with no 
subsequent benefit to Mozambique at all. The crucial factor worth considering was that 
Mozambique never implemented any oil and gas projects. As such, the requisite laws were 
not in place or suitably designed for the eventualities of this concession contract wherein no 
provision was initially made for domestic gas. The government also did not possess the 
 
13 Anadarko is a global oil and gas company 




essential experience and technical capability to provide the appropriate advice regarding the 
most expedient negotiating position. The result was that there were few options available for 
Mozambique, and ultimately their minimal participation in downstream activities was 
mostly because there were no alternative options offering a better result. To support this 
analysis, respondent 5 indicated that "at the end of the day, the level of participation of the 
host country in the value chain is down to the options available". 
 
Simulation of Multiplier Impact on Domestic Gas in Mozambique 
Another key area where Mozambique could have received greater participation in the Pande-
Temane project was that of domestic gas. Domestic gas is natural gas allocated from 
production to be used locally or sold to the host country. The principle relates to a certain 
amount of natural gas from the production fields for use by the host country in residential, 
industrial and commercial spheres of the economy. In the case of the Pande-Temane project, 
there was no provision for domestic gas at the inception of the concession.  
 
The significance of no reference to the inclusion of domestic gas in the initial Pande-Temane 
project is relevant as it relates to the participation of ENH in downstream activities and the 
potential for greater industrialisation benefits. The implication is that in addition to revenue 
benefits generated from taxes and export sales of natural gas, additional benefits can be 
produced from the utilisation of the gas by the host country in the domestic market. Of 
particular importance is the utilisation of natural gas to kick start and boost economic activity 
through industrialisation. The generation of power through gas-to-power projects is vital to 
ensuring that industries have adequate power for manufacturing, beneficiation and other 
industrial processes. The supply of domestic gas if utilised appropriately generates a 
multiplier effect of growth and development within the local economy.  
 
The analysis by Smelcer (2019) and Standard Bank (2014) corroborates these findings. In 
Smelcer’s analysis, a good example given is Qatar as a country that managed to gain greater 
value from its natural gas through appropriate participation in the value chain, principally 
using domestic gas. As illustrated in Table 5.1, Qatar used its domestic gas appropriately, 
and this was the main reason for the growth of its GDP from USD 17.5 billion in 2001 (prior 
to commercial development of its natural gas) to USD 170 billion in 2011 post-commercial 




Table 5.1: Multiplier impact of domestic gas on Qatar. 
Multiplier Impact of Natural Gas on Qatar 
 2001 Multiplier 2011 
GDP (USD billion 17,5 9,7X 170 
GDP per capita 27000 3,6X 98000 
Qatar Stock Market Capitalisation 
(USD billion) 
12 10X 125 
Banking Assets (USD billion) 16 12X 190 
 
Source: Smelcer, 2019 
An application of the multiplier effect of 9,7 experienced in Qatar to the GDP figures for 
Mozambique reveals that the GDP of Mozambique should have increased to USD61,4 
billion between 2001 and 2011, however, the actual GDP of Mozambique in 2011 was 
USD10,78 billion (World Bank, 2019). This analysis provides some perspective into the 
potential benefit for Mozambique had it adequately utilised its natural gas from the Pande-
Temane project for local industrialisation. 
 
Table 5.2: Simulation of multiplier impact of domestic gas on Mozambique 
Simulation of Multiplier Impact of Natural Gas on Mozambique 
 2001 Multiplier 
2011* 





6,33 9,7X 61.4 10,78 
 
Source: Author’s calculations*, World Bank (2019)**  
 
It is evident from the development and rollout of the Pande-Temane project from a 
participation perspective that ENH initially did not see the relevance or was not aware that 
its participation in downstream activities, principally through domestic gas could have had 
a much greater and wider-reaching impact in its economy due to the ability to unlock 





At ROMPCO, we were desperate, we had just come out of a civil war, and we 
needed investment, so the domestic gas wasn’t even specified. Gas to Matola 
(Mozambique) and others in Mozambique only came in later as an afterthought. 
The bulk of the gas was exported to South Africa. 
 
The argument is that ENH was also to receive financial benefits from the petroleum tax, 
production bonuses and its profit petroleum share of gas sales. However, the realisation was 
that these benefits were prone to the maladministration of public funds and general leakage 
of foreign currency due to the inadequate financial systems.  
Domestic gas, however, would have injected itself directly into the economy through gas to 
power, industry and residential usage programmes. Respondent 6 gives credence to this 
analysis stipulating the following:  
 
Mozambique is better of focusing on the downstream and industrialising in the 
country. There are more licensing rounds coming. So perhaps they can focus 
on industrialising the country, creating a local demand base, strengthen the 
economy, becoming a regional supplier over the next ten years and by the time 
the fifth licensing rounds yield something – they may be ready to participate in 
upstream. 
 
In response to the question of what is the appropriate balance of participatory stakes that can 
ensure an efficient and well-balanced project, respondents alluded to the need for 
proportional allocation of the participatory interest across all sections of the value chain.  
 
In reality, an LNG project is best run if there is an equal stake for all parties in 
all the parts (regardless of %) – but there must be aligned interests (e.g. 10% 
upstream 10% midstream 10% downstream) – if you have one party with a high 
percentage in upstream and a lower percentage in downstream, you get all 
kinds of dysfunction. It is important to have aligned interest across the value 
chain – but if you have 5%, you must also carry the costs and take 5% of the 




5.3 Research Objective 2: Findings on frameworks that are in place to help 
Mozambique achieve greater participation from its natural gas value chain. 
 
The other key component of the value chain in which Mozambique could accrue significant 
benefits beyond revenue from taxes and the sale of gas is the domestic gas programme. As 
articulated under the Pande-Temane analysis, domestic gas is vital to unlocking 
industrialisation and broader economic activity through projects such as gas to power, gas 
to liquids and ammonia for fertilizer. A key finding of the research was that the legislation 
which instituted the requirement for domestic gas to be allocated to the State from production 
was only implemented in 2014 through the Petroleum Law 21 of 2014. The concession 
agreements for Area 1 and Area 4, however, were concluded and signed in December 2006.  
 
It was thus in a period post-signing of the concessions that new Petroleum Law 21 of 2014 
was enacted to align with the expectations of the Mozambique government to receive a 
percentage allocation of domestic gas. In response to this new law, commitments were 
subsequently made by Area 1 and Area 4 Concessionaires to fulfil the newly legislated 
requirements for domestic gas to be available to the State. In essence, when the recent Area 
1 and Area 4 concessions were concluded, the legislative framework related to domestic gas 
(which is a fundamental law for participation) was not yet in place and as a result, after-the-
fact provisions had to be established to deliver on the domestic gas aspirations of 
Mozambique.  
 
Social Licence to Operate in Mozambique 
These findings are supported by the analysis from Standard Bank (2019) clearly articulating 
that the Area 4 Concessionaire ultimately supported domestic gas allocation, with a caveat 
that was as long as it did not interfere with the development of any of the LNG trains15. 
Review of the concession contract revealed that the concession did not make specific 
mention of domestic gas allocation, however, after passing the law, the Concessionaire made 
some provision to supply domestic gas to Mozambique.  
 
15LNG Train definition: To liquefy natural gas, it must be cooled to negative 160 degrees Celsius (about 
negative 260° Fahrenheit). The liquification plant, known as a train, involves a process consisting of a 
progression of connected steps where the raw gas is purified first, then cooled to the required temperature. 





The provision of domestic gas on these terms was analogous to a "social license" to produce 
LNG in Mozambique, which was fulfilled by what could be argued to be a voluntary 
commitment by the Concessionaire to sell gas to Mozambique for domestic use on 
commercial terms (Standard Bank, 2019:92). Although the concession agreements contained 
no obligations for domestic gas allocation, from a technical perspective, the voluntary 
domestic gas commitments were approved as part of the Plan of Development (POD) for 
Area 1 and 4 which are crucial steps to allow the Concessionaire to proceed to FID (Standard 
Bank, 2019a). From this viewpoint, when compared to the execution of the Pande-Temane 
concession, it can be argued that there was progress in terms of Mozambique's potential 
participation in the downstream part of the value chain through domestic gas allocation in 
Area 1 and Area 4 compared to Pande-Temane. 
 
Challenges in Formulating Legislation  
The respondents also raised the issue of legislation as an area that is often lacking for 
countries that discover oil and gas resources. In the case of Mozambique, respondents 
indicated that Mozambique was not prepared for the gas discoveries. Perspectives on how 
the Pande-Temane project unfolded included the following from respondent 6: 
 
One of the challenges with Pande-Temane was that Mozambique didn’t have 
petroleum laws. So, they were not familiar with key dynamics of royalties, 
taking gas in-kind as opposed to in cash and how to price the gas. So, there was 
really a lack of knowledge around the commercial aspects. At the time all they 
knew was the 2% royalty gas, which is the international standard – this they 
took in kind which went to Matola and their local use (Respondent 6). 
 
Respondent 5 went a step further to articulate common scenarios that unfold when it comes 
to the creation of natural gas legislation, and stated the following: 
 
What usually happens is gas is discovered on fairly minimalist terms – the 
government then decides they need petroleum legislation and they then seek 
advice from the very prospective Concessionaires who have more experience. 




One could argue that from the onset, it is not a fair fight, however, at the time of 
helping set up legislation, the prospective Concessionaire would be constrained 
by the following:  
(1) There are general international standards – which stipulate what 
percentage of the resource must flow back to the host nation 
(2)  Operator knows that if the participatory allocation is too little then its 
unsustainable and the deal will crumble 
(3) Then there is the local resource holding company, the petroleum SOE, 
which could put the brakes on everything if it’s unfair (Respondent 5). 
5.4 Research Objective 3: Findings on concession contract provisions relevant to 
participation in the value chain. 
 
An analysis of Area 1 and 4 contracts revealed that the majority of the provisions of both 
contracts concerning impact and relevance on value chain participation were mostly similar. 
Some differences existed in terms of the special provisions for taxes and associated 




One key observation from the research was that since the signing of the concession 
agreements for Area 1 and Area 4 in 2006, there was an extensive delay in finalisation of the 
requisite approvals required for the LNG projects to progress, specifically, approval of the 
POD. One reason emanating from the interviews was that Mozambique took its time to 
ensure that they ultimately received a better deal for their Area 1 and Area 4 gas in contrast 
to the overall outcomes of the Pande-Temane project. Respondent 6 articulated: 
 
To an extent progress on Area 1 and Area 4 delayed because ENH had the battle 
scars of Pande-Temane – so they wanted to make sure the operator does not 
underpay for the gas – so during 2011-2015 period, they went through a period 
of saying lets rather make no decision – than to make the wrong decision, like we 





Participatory Interest Provisions 
In terms of participation in the natural gas value chain, Area 1 and Area 4 contracts stipulate 
that the other parties shall fund the participatory interest of ENH in the concession until 
commercial production of natural gas begins (Anadarko Area 1 Contract, 2006:33; ENI Area 
4 Contract 2006:35). Once commercial production commences, ENH must commence 
repaying the loan to its Concessionaire partners (for the funded/carried interest) and carry 
costs associated for the development in future.  
The Area 4 contract makes provision for ENH to have a participatory interest of only 10% 
with the remaining 90%16 allocated to other Concessionaires (ENI Area 4 Contract, 
2006:11). In the case of Area 1, the concession allocates a 15% participatory interest to ENH 
with the balance17 assigned to other Concessionaires (Anadarko Area 1 Contract, 2006:8).  
 
Findings from the research reveal that participation across the LNG export value chain is 
dictated by the participatory interest allocated to each party in the concession. As articulated 
in the literature review (Box 1), the State can obtain a carried/funded participatory interest 
or cover the full cost of their stake in the development upfront. From the perspective of 
participating in the value chain, the percentage of participatory interest reflects the 
proportion of carrying costs, receiving benefits and carrying risks. In practice, a higher 
participatory interest implies a higher allocation of the profit share, greater control in terms 
of decisions of target buyers for the gas, greater influence in price negotiations for sale of 
the gas and other decisions around timing for a ramp up or ramp down of production 
activities. Findings of the research revealed that the low participatory interest of ENH 
representing the State in Area 1 and Area 4 contracts (15% & 10% respectively) meant it 
had minimal influence over activities taking place in the upstream and midstream portions 
of the value chain.  
 
 
16 Mozambique Rovuma Venture (MRV, former Eni East Africa S.p.A, a joint venture 
owned by Eni S.P.A 35.7%, ExxonMobil 35,7%, CNPC 28,6%) 70%, Kogas 10%, Galp 10 
% (Source: INP, 2019). 
17 Total, 26.5% (operator); Mitsui E&P Mozambique Area 1 Limited, 20%; BPRL Ventures 
Mozambique B.V., 10 %; Beas Rovuma Energy Mozambique Limited, 10%; ONGC Videsh 




Role of Greater Participatory Interest 
Another finding regarding the relevance of the level of participatory interest relates to how 
ENH could more rapidly fund its participation share. Interviews revealed that if ENH had 
been allocated a higher participation percentage in the concession contracts, this could have 
allowed them to sell a small percentage to raise funding to pay for their stake.  
 
What transpired with the Area 4 concession contracts was that as ENI held an initial stake 
of 70%, it could sell off multiple portions of its stake to other parties, including Exxon 
Mobile and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The research revealed that the 
Mozambique law limits the participation of the State to no less than 5% and no more than 
20% (Law 15 of 2011). Respondent 1 articulated this point stipulating the following: 
 
The participation interest is low, it needs to go up to about 30-40% so that we 
can sell some of it and use the money to pay for our equity. Look at Anadarko 
and ENI; they have made money without even developing the project - just 
selling their stakes (Respondent 1). 
5.5 Research Objective 4: Findings on barriers that hinder achievement of greater 
participation in the natural gas value chain.  
 
This final section provides an analysis and findings of some of the barriers hindering how 
Mozambique could potentially gain greater participation in the natural gas value chain. 
 
The Financing Conundrum 
Responses from the interviews emphasised the importance of financing to obtain greater 
participation in the value chain. When was asked if Mozambique should look to gaining 
more access to the upstream part of the value chain – Respondent 7 replied: “do they have 
the money?” This strikingly straightforward answer spoke to the reality of participating in 
the upstream part of the oil and gas value chain that financial muscle is a core element of 
what is required.  
 
Global financing dynamics significantly influence participation in the natural gas value 
chain, particularly upstream because of the globally traded and large-scale capital nature of 




Australia and Nigeria delivered to key demand hubs mostly in Asia and Europe. As 
illustrated in Figure 5.1 below, the LNG suppliers operate in an international market 
landscape.  
 
With a finite amount of demand on a global scale, there is a limit to the number of LNG 
projects the global market can uptake as emphasised by one respondent who stipulated the 
following.  
 
At the end of the day one has to look at demand and supply of LNG globally, by 
2020 there could be an oversupply of LNG. Australia has just brought on at least 
three new LNG facilities, and they cancelled one LNG plant due to demand 
concerns. The whole development of the Mozambique fields was a race to market 
with Australia, Tanzania and others – so the world supply of LNG is key 
(Respondent 7). 
 
Figure 5.1: Global Trading Landscape for LNG
Sources, IEA (2019a) 
Analysis from other authors corroborated the findings from the research regarding financing 
and demand dynamics. As illustrated in Figure 5.2 below, assuming all things are equal 
(ceteris paribus), the greater the global supply, or supply potential – the lower prices become 
as suppliers outcompete each other to secure global demand. This results in the abandonment 
of some LNG projects as smaller facilities struggle to be profitable compared to larger 
facilities that benefit from economies of scale with the effect of reducing supply and 




Equilibrium is ultimately reached at some point between a proportion of 
abandonment/reduced supply and increased demand and subsequently rising prices 
(Standard Bank, 2014: 34) 
 
Figure 5.2: Demand and Supply Dynamics for Natural Gas 
 
Source: Author’s constructions. 
The significance of these economic dynamics lies in how natural gas projects are financed 
on a global scale. As articulated in the literature review, a project finance approach is 
typically used for large-scale LNG projects. This method implies that finance is secured off 
the back of agreements with potential buyers and tied to future cashflows. Given that demand 
is finite within a given period, there is a limit to the number of projects that can successfully 
secure finance underpinned by future sales agreements. The movement of the supply curve 
from S0 to S1 and then to S2, also implies that speed to market is critical. If a State or a 
supplier misses the window of opportunity to develop an LNG project while appropriate 
conditions exist to secure sales agreements, given the highly competitive nature of the 
market this could result in abandonment or halting of the project.  
 
With the increased potential supply of low-cost shale gas from the United States of America 
into the global market, estimates indicate that supply for LNG is likely to overshoot demand 
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by 2040 and this has material implications for the ability to secure finance for Mozambique 
(Exxon Mobile, 2019; Standard Bank, 2014; IEA, 2019a). 
 
Project Finance Dynamics 
What then does this mean for Mozambique? As a start, it is important to recognise that there 
are two key elements to financing oil and gas projects. The first key element, already 
discussed in the literature review, is the project finance structure which leans on sourcing 
funding underpinned by potential cashflows from future sales of the proven resource. The 
financing of natural gas projects is a global contest, the forces of global demand and supply, 
economies of scale and equilibrium pricing determine whether there is enough offtake in the 
market at the prevailing price to allow for projects to be financed. The ability to secure 
offtakes to commence development is thus vital – and cannot be influenced to a large degree 
through laws or policies set by the State, as free-market economics largely determine this 
trajectory. In other words, the State may struggle to use legislation for the upstream part of 
the value chain to gain greater participation. Rather, the dynamics of free global market 
economics will largely dictate at least the financing portion of this debate. Respondent 5 
confirmed this stipulating that “for LNG, the market will always be more efficient at 
allocating costs, risks and reward”. 
 
Upfront Risk Capital Barriers 
The second component to financing oil and gas projects is the upfront risk capital required 
to conduct exploration with no guarantees of finding any resource in the ground. The 
assertion is that a significant amount of capital is required at risk in order to participate in 
the upstream part of the value chain to conduct exploration activities. The respondents 
similarly echoed this perspective. 
 
Remember when you do the initial drilling programs you don’t know what’s 
there, you only have two- and three-dimensional data, which reflects what the 
geology is like and you can map it out and draw some conclusions. So you won’t 
know until you drill – and this can come out successful or not – globally you can 
work-out the success rate of drilling campaigns – it’s probably around 20%. The 
question can be, for the risk private sector takes of say USD 1 billion, what 






I can tell you a lot of stories about drilling and finding enormous amounts of gas 
and I can also tell you stories of finding nothing upon nothing upon nothing. 
Exploration is in many organisations up to USD1 billion to USD 2 billion per 
year depending on how good their team is and the basins they have been given 
access (Respondent 5).  
 
The ability of the State to spend some “at-risk” capital to conduct exploration is thus a 
significant barrier to entry in the upstream part of the value chain. The majority of the large 
international oil and gas conglomerates are heavily capitalised with strong balance sheets 
allowing them to conduct exploration off the back of their balance sheets. Most States do 
not have this luxury, particularly across the African continent. The reality is that for these 
multinational oil and gas conglomerates, risk capital typically either comes from equity 
investors or other capital market sources. A State in the position of Mozambique that recently 
emerged from civil war and is battling scandals of financial mismanagement would not have 
either in abundance within the hydrocarbons company ENH (i.e., significant access to capital 
markets or profits sitting on the balance sheet). A deliberate strategy would be required by 
Mozambique to actively convert ENH from a typical SOE to a highly commercial company 
for it to participate substantively in the upstream section of the value chain, given the 
financial constraints.  
 
Commercialisation Strategies for Natural Gas  
Issues of financing aligned with the perspectives of respondents regarding the importance of 
commercialising the natural gas as a first step. Interviews revealed that the concept of 
gaining higher value through greater participation was primarily dependent on Mozambique 
successfully managing to commercialise the mineral resource. Respondents emphasised that 
without Mozambique managing to produce LNG successfully, there would be no prospect 
or debate about any value at all. Respondent 5 indicated that: 
 
 Mozambique must ensure the attempt to get things done better does not derail 
the effort of getting it done at all”. Respondent 5 went on to articulate that “an 




If you consider upstream, LNG to plant, port to ship to markets, all this is the 
most complex to do and nothing that the government does must upset the 
complexity of pulling this value chain together.  
 
Feedback from respondent 7 also provided similar views where the respondent stipulated 
that: 
 The whole issue with gas is about bringing it to market. In remote areas like 
Mozambique, they call it stranded gas because there is no domestic market to 
monetize it, so the best way to monetize it is to export LNG.  
 
Respondent 6 also shared similar views indicating: “The LNG export is important because 
it allows Mozambique to accumulate enough capital to industrialise the country and to 
actually go about participating in downstream activities”. 
 
The respondents further considered the dynamics around why commercialisation was a key 
prerequisite to any discussion regarding gaining greater value. The critical point made by 
respondent 5 was that the process of attempting to commercialise the natural gas resource, 
considering the complexity of the production process, raised issues of who participated in 
the project, in what proportion and with what responsibilities. Essentially, given the complex 
nature of commercialising natural gas, there are specific demands in terms of capability and 
experience that naturally dictate the level and extent of State participation, which are 
unavoidable if the State wishes to receive any value at all. Respondent 5 articulated the 
following:  
 
Let’s assume operator A finds gas, now they must decide if they can develop it 
themselves, or if they need partners. Now consider that Mozambique has very 
limited capability in this space because, by the time the gas is discovered, it’s too 
late to start developing this State capability, as such external partners are 
required to participate. If you look at the participants in Area 1 & Area 4 
concessions, they have been put together into the consortium because they each 
bring something. Some parties are not big enough to pull it off by themselves; 





Technology, Experience and Capability Barriers 
Respondent 5 thus emphasised that the debate about participation cannot be isolated from 
the fundamental technological and experience capability required to commercialise the 
natural gas for there to be any discussion about gaining greater value. Respondent 6 also 
echoed this, stating that most national oil companies do not possess the capability. 
Respondent 6 indicated: 
 
National oil companies don’t have the technical capability to participate in 
upstream, they have an equity stake there because they are the vehicle through 
which the government owns part of upstream activities – this is a global standard 
– if a country discoveries oil, they need to get something back – and this is 
through the upstream participation (Respondent 6). 
 
Considering the concept of domestic gas as a potential vehicle to achieving greater value for 
Mozambique, respondent 7 mentioned other potential stumbling blocks that needed 
consideration if this route was to be followed. The core arguments were that 
commercialisation of natural gas was dependent on there being a captive market. If the gas 
were for domestic use, there must be adequate demand from industry, residential and 
commercial applications and a core driver was the need for a burgeoning population. 
Feedback from respondent 7 indicated the following: 
 
Of the 30 million people in Mozambique, roughly 50% is urbanised – so there 
isn’t a huge demand for residential gas. The infrastructure costs are so high, so 
you need to find anchor consumers in order to be able to make it work, so that’s 
why first and foremost one needs to look at an LNG export facility (Respondent 
7).  
Respondent 2 also echoed similar sentiments regarding prospects of supplying domestic gas 
to the local market as a means of achieving greater value stipulating the following:  
 
ENH needs credible off-takers for the domestic gas – this is critical! Currently 
in Mozambique they don’t have credible domestic off-takers that would allow 




We need credible offtakes we can tie down to the investments, and we don’t have 
that here in Mozambique – so we look to South Africa for potential offtakes 
(Respondent 2). 
 
If the domestic market is not sufficient to ensure adequate offtake of the natural gas, a 
regional market would be required, and in the case of the SADC regional market, the biggest 
offtake would be power generation. To demonstrate the point, respondent 7 articulated the 
following:  
 
If you step out of Mozambique and look regionally, the regional population is 
also relatively small, and the infrastructure pipeline costs are so high. Once you 
get a pipeline transmitting gas – you can then get off-takers – but you need a 
population to support this (Respondent 7). 
 
The respondents further clarified that the fundamental issues with obtaining a regional 
offtake for power were heavily dependent on South Africa, and this was also a political issue. 
Respondents used the stagnated development of the natural gas industry in Namibia due to 
lack of a domestic market and inability to secure Eskom18 as an offtake as a prime example. 
To communicate this point, respondent 7 indicated: 
 
Kudu gas in Namibia was discovered in the 1970s, and it still has not been 
developed – among other reasons, Eskom needed to supply the MOU to offtake 
the power - but this didn’t happen because it would have become competition for 
Eskom. In addition, Namibia’s domestic demand was a small demand – so even 
with an Independent Power Producer (IPP) in Namibia – the balance of the 
electricity would have been sold back into the South African grid. The biggest 
issue was the Namibians didn’t have enough demand – so the obvious thing was 









Comparisons with Tanzania indicated that the politics of having Eskom as a major offtake 
did not affect Tanzania. Respondent 7 indicated the following: “Let’s take Tanzania as an 
example – they have a gas pipeline that feeds Dar es Salaam. Tanzania does not have the 
same politics of needing to keep Eskom running, so Tanzania has power as the biggest 
offtake.” 
 
The core argument was that it was essential to determine if the South African government 
wanted Eskom to continue to survive using coal as a key feedstock, or if they were going the 
IPP route. This was deemed material because power is the biggest offtake for Mozambique 
domestic gas, and South Africa was the biggest potential customer. Therefore, the discussion 
concerning acquiring a key power anchor customer for Mozambique’s domestic gas must 
start with a political decision about the survival of Eskom. Respondent 2 also suggested that 
credible power offtakes were few and far apart in the region, regardless of the demand. The 
key point made was that demand was only classified as “real” demand if the customer was 
willing and able to pay for the power, something that has been a struggle for most SADC 
countries and indeed Mozambique’s domestic market over the decades. Feedback from 
respondent 2 indicated the following: 
 
Our people say they need power, so there is demand but if it’s not bankable then 
there is no real demand. To effectively use our domestic gas, we need to look at 
alternative ways of monetizing our gas - the reality is that people don’t pay their 
electricity bills in time. Even if it makes sense to the politicians to put up power 
plants in area A, B or C, people won’t pay the bills – so do we then subsidize to 
make it bankable? So, yes, we want industrialisation in Mozambique, but can we 
bank on it? (Respondent 2). 
 
Respondent 4 also shared some opinions on the issue of options. The key argument was that 
South Africa is the most captive market, but South Africa must offer a better deal for 
Mozambique, one that recognised that Mozambique sought greater participation and to 
unlock development for its people. Respondent 4 remarked as follows:  
 
Northern Mozambique still needs to be developed, similar to the effort that South 




parts of the country –so if you want to get gas from ENH, you need to put these 
development ideas on the table. South Africa needs to offer something to ENH, 
for setting up local industries in Mozambique. The reality is that ENH can sell 
the gas to any other market, but South Africa is the closest market, so we must 
negotiate – all you need to do is look at the amounts of money we spend to solve 
problems such as power shortages with Eskom (Respondent 4). 
 
Skills Development and Capacity Building 
From a skills and technology perspective, the current experience of Mozambique is that there 
are weak provisions in the concession contracts for skills transfer. The provisions in Article 
14 of the Area 1 contract, as an example, are generally vague with regards to express 
stipulations for skills development. The contract indicates that "In pursuing Petroleum 
operations, the Concessionaire shall endeavour, as far as possible, to employ citizens of the 
Republic of Mozambique who have appropriate qualifications..." (Anadarko Area 1 
Contract, 2006:51). The constitution of skills transfer was thus to some extent left to the 
Concessionaire to determine upon execution (albeit with the consultation and agreement 
required by the minister on the final proposals).  
 
Interviews with respondents also pointed to the significant issue of skills and capacity 
building relevant to the debate about how to attain greater value and access to the value 
chain. Respondent 5, as an example, emphasised the need for the State to a create strong in-
house capability that could build options and negotiate with potential investors.  
 
Firstly, for a 3–5 year period – You need to form a joint team of a clean non-
corruptible government officials and an international gas consultancy with 
extensive experience. You need to simultaneously on a non-corrupt basis work 
on four options – and have the financial muscle to develop all the options and 
choose between them. This process must be non-corrupt, fully funded and must 
draw on international experience (Respondent 5). 
  
Respondent 6 also made some observations about the need for greater knowledge and 
technical capability if Mozambique wanted to gain greater access to other parts of the value 





Over the years ENH has sent people to leading oil and gas companies such as 
Anadarko and ENI to get a better understanding but I don’t know if ENH will set 
up an entire division just to focus on technical skills capacity building to either 
know enough to start making inroads in upstream – or if they are comfortable to 
know enough to just play in the downstream (Respondent 6). 
 
Respondent 5 also emphasised the importance of technical and negotiating capability not 
only for purposes of gaining greater value, but for gaining any value at all.  
 
For all these options, there are counterparts – so Mozambique also needs a 
negotiating team. Unfortunately, it usually comes down to meetings with the 
minister at bars at night, but this is not what it should come down to. Mozambique 
needs to have negotiators who can deal with potential gas buyers or power plant 
developers. Mozambique needs to develop gas utilization options and negotiate 
in parallel – If they don’t – they will be taken to the cleaners because they will 
have no fall-back options. Unfortunately, typically neither the capability, time 
nor options are invested – so it usually comes down to the minster – but he has 
no developed options to choose from (Respondent 5). 
5.6 Conclusions 
In terms of participation in the value chain, it can be concluded that it may be difficult for 
Mozambique and indeed other oil and gas producing nations to legislate their way into the 
upstream part of the oil and sector. This difficulty can be attributed to the global nature of 
the financial system that underpins this participation and high barriers to entry in the form 
of large multinationals that possess the risk capital to execute exploration activities at scale, 
while typical African SOEs do not possess this capability.  
 
However, the conclusion is that States can potentially legislate their way into the 
downstream part of the value chain with less complexity. The key difference here is that of 
the two financial requirements (upfront risk capital and project finance capital), downstream 
activities to a greater degree only require the latter because the upstream part of the value 




Of course, normal technical and other project risks may still occur as with any project at 
either stage, but the barrier to entry ceases to be the availability of risk capital, and as such, 
legislation can be an effective tool to gain greater access or create the conditions required. 
 
Another conclusion based on the findings is that greater benefit for participation in the value 
chain for States could be more expediently extracted (at least in the early stages of discovery) 
by not taking on the challenge in the parts of the value chain where SOEs face very high 
barriers to entry and have little influence to change the outcome (i.e., upstream).  
The SOEs are perhaps better placed to exert significant effort in the downstream part of the 
value chain where there are lower barriers to entry, and they can more effectively utilise 
State tools such as legislation to enter this market without deterring investment through 
aggressive policies such as nationalisation. As already communicated, the multiplier effect 





CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This dissertation aimed to investigate whether Mozambique could achieve greater 
participation from its mineral resources value chain. A case study methodology was utilised 
based on qualitative research design to investigate the historical participation of 
Mozambique in its natural gas value chain, capacity demands, legislative frameworks in 
place to aid greater participation, provisions of select concession contracts and barriers to 
achieving greater participation. The following chapter now sets out the conclusions and 
recommendations that have emanated from this research. 
6.2 Conclusion and Recommendations  
The conclusions and recommendations have been set out in accordance with the research 
objectives. The intention is for them to be utilised in Mozambique, or to be transposed to 
other mineral rich African countries seeking to gain greater participation in their value chains 
in order to attain greater benefit for the masses. 
 
Research Objective 1: To understand the history of Mozambique’s participation in its 
natural gas value chain. 
 
The research conducted revealed that when Mozambique discovered the first natural gas in 
the Pande-Temane fields, it did not secure adequate participation in the downstream 
activities. There were no provisions for domestic gas in the project, and as a result, the 
research showed that the possible multiplier effect of an increase in GDP that Mozambique 
should have received was not attained when compared to other countries, for example, Qatar 
through the utilisation of domestic gas. This conclusion is supported by World Bank (2003) 
who articulate that Mozambique did not fully receive its fiscal benefits from the project due 
to the structure of the Pande-Temane project, which had skewed benefit towards the private 
investor. It can thus be concluded that with the first natural gas project, Mozambique did not 
receive full benefit from the natural gas resource due to inadequate participation in the value 
chain, a result which the research has attributed to a lack of preparedness  in terms of 





Further to these conclusions, it is recommended that any effort to prepare countries that have 
or are about to discover natural resources would be beneficial. This would create a certain 
level of “operational readiness” to be able to receive the legal, technical, financial and 
political realities that come with the development of large-scale, billion-dollar Mega-
Projects. Standard Bank (2014) refers to this as the need for countries to “invest in investing” 
by developing the required capability to adequately appraise projects that may be possible 
in the future due to increased revenues (Standard Bank 2014: 45).  
 
Research Objective 2: To determine the legislative frameworks that were in place to help 
Mozambique achieve greater participation from its natural gas value chain 
 
The research concluded that legislative frameworks to support greater participation in the 
value chain were not adequately in place prior to signing of the Pande-Temane, Area 1, or 
Area 4 concession contracts. Laws expressly making provision for domestic gas as an 
example (which is a mechanism to increase participation in the downstream part of the value 
chain) were only enacted in 2014, whereas concessions for Pande-Temane, Area 1 and Area 
4 blocks were concluded in 2000, and 2006 respectively. In addition, the research concluded 
that the legislative framework in Mozambique lacked adequate specificity regarding issues 
such as mechanics of how the State spreads itself across the value chain beyond mere 
specification of the participatory interest, as well as provisions of how the State could embed 
itself as a participant in the value chain through technology transfer and skills development. 
It was also concluded that the ability of Mozambique to legislate its way into the upstream 
part of the value chain could be difficult due to the global financing dynamics that 
significantly influence this section of the value chain. To this end, securing offtake 
agreements to attract finance in the upstream part of the value chain is vital if the project is 
to proceed. This conclusion is supported by the IEA which articulates that “For a liquid 
natural gas liquefaction plant to obtain a Final Investment Decision (FID), binding long-term 
contracts covering most of the output (85% on average between 2009-16) have been required 







Noting the above conclusions, it is recommended that States put in place the required 
legislative frameworks prior to engagement of private investors in concession contracts. This 
accordingly requires investment in the development of skills and knowledge in the natural 
gas sector in anticipation of the development of the projects. Given the noted complexity of 
Mozambique legislating its way into the value chain, from a legislation perspective, It is also 
further recommended that  Mozambique is perhaps better placed to exert significant effort 
in the downstream part of the value chain which has lower barriers to entry where the country 
can effectively utilise State tools such as legislation to make inroads into this market without 
deterring investment through aggressive policies such as nationalisation.  
 
Research Objective 3: To determine contract provisions relevant to participation in the 
value chain  
 
From a contractual perspective the research concluded that the quality of participatory 
interest provisions of the concession contracts have a pivotal role to play in determining the 
level of influence and control that the State can yield in the project in order to achieve greater 
benefit. The research also revealed that the Mozambique did not have sufficient participatory 
interest in the concessions to wield noteworthy control and decision-making power in the 
upstream and midstream parts of the value chain.  
 
Considering the above conclusions, it is recommended that consideration must be given for 
the ability of States to make decisions that will promote the availability of gas in the 
downstream part of the value chain. This can be done through ensuring adequate 
participatory interest in the concession contracts which can aid the level of influence (not 
control) in the upstream part through the concession contracts. Yes, multinationals can take 
on the upstream exploration and development risk in the early discoveries because they are 
better placed to manage it, given their experience and financial resources, however, some 
influence must be retained by the State through the provisions in the concession contracts 
even in the upstream part to avoid later downstream efforts being scuffled (at least in the 








Research Objective 4: To determine barriers that hinder achievement of greater 
participation in the natural gas value chain 
 
It can be concluded from this analysis that greater participation in the value chain is required 
to increase benefits to the State. The analysis provided indicates that given the barriers to 
entry in the upstream part of the value chain such as upfront risk capital and advanced 
technology capability demands, the most suitable entry point for Mozambique (and perhaps 
the other African States) is to start by focusing on accessing the downstream part of the value 
chain, specifically the domestic gas component. This downstream section of the value chain 
presents the best mechanism to unlock economic potential through multiplier effects of 
industrialisation and growth (beyond the collection of taxes and royalty revenue by the 
State). The domestic gas as a mechanism for entry is also well suited to the tools available 
to the State, principally legislation to secure supply of domestic gas from Concessionaires 
and economic policy which encourages the use of domestic gas as the main energy source 
that is part of the energy mix. The potential accessibility of the downstream part of the value 
chain through domestic gas thus potentially holds greater prospects, compared to the 
upstream (exploration) part which is heavily restricted by technology demands and global 
financial market dynamics (at least in the early years of natural resource discovery). Standard 
Bank (2014) also supports this conclusion stating that one of the ways to obtain greater value 
from the extractive resources such as natural gas in addition to revenue from taxes and gas 
sales, is through stimulating economic activity. This can be done they argue "through 
building local industry off the back of domestic gas made available to Mozambique" 
(Standard Bank 2014: 44). 
 
Considering the above conclusions, a key recommendation to achieving greater participation 
is a progressive approach with initially limited participation in strategic parts of the value 
chain to unlock industrialisation, economic activity and much-needed revenue. Revenue 
generated from these activities can then be utilised to gain greater participation in other parts 
of the value chain. Greater participation across the entire value chain cannot be legislated. 
Although legislation can assist, particularly in the downstream part, real success is a function 
of the host country's ability to acquire technology and skills, attract financial capital required 





Mozambique could take advantage in future broader participation in upstream activities once 
they complete the fifth licensing/tendering round and if gas is found in this phase. Revenue 
as well as industrial and economic benefits from the first 4-8 trains of LNG planned from 
Area 1 and Area 4 could thus be leveraged to achieve this reality. 
 
Indeed, greater participation is about building capacity and capability within a specific time 
horizon, guided by a particular strategy. It may be that this dissertation is of limited 
assistance to the gas sector in Mozambique if no new gas is found in the fifth 
licensing/tendering round. However, for other countries such as South Africa who only 
recently started exploration in 2019 through Total, the fundamental knowledge can be 
applied with significant and widespread impact, and perhaps also transposed with some 
adaptation to other mineral-rich nations (not necessarily natural gas).  
6.3 Areas for Future Study 
An area for future study could be further analysis of which policies and frameworks could 
be established to allow each of the constituent parts of the host country being the State, local 
private sector and local communities to gain greater participation. This research could 
include a critical analysis of indigenisation policies, policies allowing local communities to 
have shareholdings in natural gas projects (similar to policies in the mining sector) and well-
defined policies of how the government can create a conducive environment to allow for 
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My name is Kudzanayi Bangure. I am conducting some research under the University of 
Cape Town, Faculty of Commerce: Nelson Mandela School of Governance. 
 
My research topic is “an analysis of whether Mozambique can gain greater participation in 
the natural gas value chain” and I have further chosen Mozambique as my case study. 
 
The research seeks to interrogate the fundamental rules, power dynamics, and nuances of 
appropriate conditions that govern the participation of African States within mineral 
resources value chains. The research seeks to answer the question that seems to continue to 
elude African countries regarding how to substantively participate in these value chains.  
 
The objective is to identify how African countries, specifically Mozambique can better 
participate in mineral resources value chains to chart a roadmap towards increased local 
benefit from African natural mineral resources. 
 
I would like to discuss the aforementioned topic with you via a telephonic/skype interview. 
You will not be requested to supply any identifiable information, ensuring anonymity of 
your responses. This research has also been approved by the Commerce Faculty Ethics in 
Research Committee of the University of Cape Town.   
 
Please advise if I can schedule some time with you in the following 2 weeks for a brief 
interview.  
 


















SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDE 
 
Research Objective 1: To understand the history of Mozambique’s participation its natural 
gas value chain.  
• What natural gas projects have been executed in Mozambique? 
• What is your view on how Pande-Temane project was rolled out? 
• Did they give the gas away too cheap?  
• What could Mozambique do differently to what was done historically in order to 
achieve better participation in their natural gas value chain?  
• What can Mozambique do not to squander the Area 1 & 4 opportunity? 
 
Research Objective 2: To determine the legislative frameworks that are in place to help 
Mozambique achieve greater participation from its natural gas value chain. 
• What legislative frameworks are in place to underpin how Mozambique can achieve 
greater participation from the natural gas value chain?  
• How can legislation play a greater role in achieving greater participation for 
Mozambique in the natural gas value chain? 
• Is the legislation sufficient to achieve greater participation? 
 
Research Objective 3: To determine concession contract provisions relevant to participation 
in the value chain. 
• Which provisions have been used in the concession contracts to achieve greater 
participation in the natural value chain? 
• Is technology transfer possible and can this be done through the contracts? 
• What advise can be given to the government about structure and execution of 
concession contracts to achieve greater participation? 
• Should Mozambique focus on upstream given where they are now? 
• Is it wishful thinking that Mozambique can participate upstream at this stage? 
 
 
Research Objective 4: To determine key inputs and entry points for achieving greater 
participation in the natural gas value chain.  
• What are the barriers that could hinder Mozambique from gaining greater benefit 
from its natural gas value chain? 
• How can Mozambique overcome the hurdle of large-scale capital required for a State 
led natural gas industry development campaign?  
• What is your take of the realities associated with financing required for exploration 




• What are some of your thoughts on how Mozambique can get best value for their 
gas? 
• In your view what is the role of the market in assisting the Government of 
Mozambique to get better outcomes?  
• Does the market have a role in that sense at all? Or its limited to efficient extraction 
commercialization and distribution?  
• How have other actors (or countries) managed to achieve better participation in the 
natural gas value chain and under what conditions has this been achieved?  
• What can Mozambique do to reach where the likes of Saudi Aramco are in terms of 
capability?  
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